In a televised address on September 7^th, US President George W. Bush acknowledged that America’s efforts to stabilize post-war Iraq needed swift assistance. Intermittent attacks on coalition troops, sabotage of critical economic infrastructure, internecine violence, assassinations of moderate political figures, and the bombing of the UN headquarters seemed to have forced a re-examination of the ways and means to achieve security in that broken country.

The apparent climb-down from the position that America (along with Britain and a coterie of third-stringers) could successfully go it alone took place amid a rising chorus of criticism and I-told-you-so’s. Opponents of US policy snickered at its ‘humiliating retreat’, evidently more intent on winning an ideological argument than proposing solutions to a problem which even they did not foresee. Most believed that the major post-war challenge would be the plight of refugees and displaced persons. Some predicted anti-American terrorism. Very few anticipated that reconstruction and development would be actively opposed by dissident Iraqis.

One detects an understandable, but otherwise mean-spirited desire to see the US fail. The unspoken hope is that a chastened America, confronted by the limits of its power, will learn from and not repeat what many consider to be the mistakes of the last few months.

Those who wish this will be disappointed. Had America not foolishly assumed that the coalition would rule over a pliant population, it would still have moved to topple Saddam Hussein. The only difference would have been in the approach. There would have been more US troops to garrison the country, and there would have been a greater effort to reconstitute domestic security services which demobilized themselves toward the end of the war. The present security vacuum is not solely the result of American short-sightedness. It would have been foolhardy to the hand-over police and intelligence duties to Iraqis when most of the experienced officers were servants of the ancien regime. 

Some continental European officials have gone as far as to suggest that the international ‘community’ should withhold support for the reconstruction effort; that it should wait until the US becomes so desperate for help that it is forced to cede political and military control of the mission to the UN Security Council. As cathartic as it may be to watch America twist in the wind, pragmatic Europeans will not allow these sentiments to form the basis of their policy. A ‘humiliated’ America, exhausted by its term as the principal guarantor of Iraq’s security, will be disinclined to remain constructively engaged elsewhere in the world. Many would undoubtedly welcome this. But recall the 1993 Somalia debacle and how it shrank Washington’s appetite for involvement in regions outside its traditional sphere of interest. As a not altogether indirect result, the Rwandan genocide was allowed to run its evil course.

And however tempting it may be in Europe (and Canada) to stand and watch the ‘hyper-power’ get its comeuppance, denying material help would not diminish the need for additional troops in Iraq. Where would America find them, if not among the allies? There is little doubt that Washington would pull its substantial forces out of the Balkans, where they still constitute the single largest national contingent among the NATO peacekeeping forces. Without American political and military muscle, the ill-equipped European Union would be hard-pressed to keep the fires of ethnic nationalism from igniting once again on its doorstep.

While America, Europe, and Russia argue over terms of engagement in Iraq, one is struck by how close they are on the political ends. Neither France nor Germany have sought to chart a political course for Iraq that is markedly different from the one envisioned by the US and Britain. All agree on the need to hand over power to Iraqi authorities as soon as possible. The question is, how can one tell when those authorities and the institutions are mature enough to handle the rigours of governing?

Still, it is advisable that power be re-distributed in favour of the Security Council. The collective weight of the richest and most powerful nations hold out some hope that Iraq’s rehabilitation will be assured over the long term. But greater UN involvement may not be the panacea that its proponents would have us believe. There are two reasons for this.

For twelve years, between the end of the first Gulf War and the start of the second, the Security Council was never able to reconcile its duty to enforce its own resolutions with Saddam’s unwillingness to comply with them. Similar disagreements on means (although not ends) could very well play themselves out again, with Iraqis none the better. Recall how Washington was accused of putting its own economic (ie. petroleum) interests ahead of regional peace and security in the months leading up to the war. By ceding power to Council members France and Russia, each of whom have significant oil interests at stake, a clash of interests is sure to ensue – again to the detriment of Council unity and the reconstruction effort. 

And what are we to make of the notion that a more multinational UN-mandated force on the ground in Iraq would be have greater legitimacy than the current Anglo-American one? (This must surely rank as the non-sequitur of the year.) Legitimacy in whose eyes? Germany’s? Canada’s? The 25 per cent of the Frenchmen who wanted Saddam to win the war?

If the rhetoric of multilateralism is nothing more than an appeal to Western public opinion, it will not be enough to secure the peace. This is because successful occupation depends on more than just adequate troop levels to maintain law and order. As the occupations of post-war Germany and Japan clearly demonstrate, success depends on the quiescence of the defeated population; a collective desire to see their own lot improved. This is not something that an intervention force can ensure, no matter how large or multinational it is. Unless it is willing to extract compliance from the vanquished – to declare marital law or evacuate the cities of the ‘Sunni triangle’ and raise them to the ground - neither the current Anglo-US force nor a bigger, internationalized one will necessarily be able to deliver.

Civil-military relations are not all bad, mind you. A portion of the Iraqi population has shown a willingness to work with the United States and its partners. The formation of the Governing Council, the partial re-constitution of the police services, and the eagerness of Iraqis to sign up with the new the civil defence force are hopeful signs. But a larger segment of the population is probably biding its time, neither co-operating nor obstructing, but simply waiting to see who emerges victorious from the guerrilla war being played out in the streets. Lingering fears of a return of the Baathists, combined with fear of being branded a collaborator, will continue to prevent many citizens from doing work vital to the country’s survival, such as working in the oil sector or passing on information about planned attacks on fellow citizens, coalition troops, foreign missions and international aid workers.

Then there is a fraction of the population that simply does not accept Iraq’s defeat, that rejects all foreign involvement and the progressive, modernizing influence it brings. These disparate forces – Baathists, ultra-nationalists and radical Islamists, their ranks allegedly buttressed by foreign jihadis – are united in their contempt for the West. Demonstrating their hatred is far more important to them than working for the security of their brethren. The attacks on coalition forces and on the UN headquarters in Baghdad bear this out. Their message: “We care not a jot for your supposedly benign intentions. We will stop at nothing to discredit you. We are more willing to die than you are. We will not shrink from slaughtering our own countrymen if that it the price of your departure. Leave now, and let us bomb and shoot our way to power. Do not obstruct our efforts to re-impose dictatorship.”

Would a more ‘international’ stabilization force be any more legitimate in the eyes of these forces - these hard men who exert a disproportionate degree of influence over Iraq’s future? Doubtful. If anything, the radicals and rejectionists will greet European, Asian, and Indian troops (especially the latter) as interlopers and infidels come to keep Muslims in chains. They will rub their hands gleefully at the arrival of non-American forces, knowing that instead of 130,000 live targets to shoot at, the ‘legitimate’ force will simply offer them more.

All this may explain why Security Council members are dickering over means, as opposed to ends. By demanding that Washington cede political control over the mission, France, Germany, and Russia are giving themselves a way out. They suspect that America will be loath to share power, having invested so much blood and treasure (not to mention prestige) in defeating Saddam and discrediting his rule by attempting to plant the seeds of proto-democracy in Iraq. Thus by setting the bar so high that a sullen Administration will be unwilling to hurdle it, the players can absolve themselves of the responsibility of tackling the insurgency and committing the monies needed to rebuild.

And who can blame them? They preferred to contain Saddam – an impossible task as it turned out – rather than seek his overthrow. They may have grudgingly welcomed the demise of his regime, but having invested so much political capital in opposing the war, they are unenthusiastic about wading into a situation not of their own making. Bedsides, Europe is much more inclined to reconcile itself to the existence of terrorism and roguish behaviour than George W. Bush’s America, which since 9/11 has vainly sought ‘perfect security’.

But continental Europe’s gamesmanship may have the opposite effect of what it intends - an American withdrawal from the Balkans being only one possibility. The impasse in the Security Council may be more than a philosophical argument about the proper ways and means to promote security in the world’s trouble spots. It may in fact be a thinly-veiled attempt to conceal Europe’s own carefully-crafted strategic impotence. We have seen this before. Many NATO nations publicly expressed their disappointment that America did not call upon its allies to assist it in disposing of the Taliban. But my conversations with European officials in late 2001 revealed that several were privately relieved that they were not asked to join the posse. Having cashed in their ‘peace dividends’ at the end of the Cold War, they had little of value to contribute, and little desire to do so anyway.

If a larger UN role in Iraq brings the physical and psychological security that most Iraqis crave, so much the better. It should be tried, if for no other reason that it may bring sorely-need human and financial resources onto the playing field. It may also serve to remind America that war is too blunt an instrument with which to build a stable international order.

How well will this grand strategic bargain work? Will it end the insurgency, turn on the lights, and get the oil flowing? Only time will tell. In the interim, a few lessons can be learned. The first is that allies do matter – perhaps not in the war-fighting phase, but certainly in the post-war, rehabilitative phase. In not endeavouring to bring its allies along with it in the weeks before the war, America virtually ensured that it did not have the skill-sets needed to shore up the uneasy ‘peace’ it had created.

The second lesson revolves around the concept of ‘legitimacy’. The exercise of power without legitimacy is almost always counter-productive. But when we speak of the legitimacy of a UN-sanctioned effort it as if it were a matter of faith, we are having a conversation with ourselves. Legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder. Just as it can be held up as ‘proof’ benign intent, it can be disputed and scorned by a radical few. For these people - people who would defy all attempts to liberalize a stubbornly illiberal part of the globe - Western notions of legitimacy are of no consequence. They will pursue their agenda and terrorize anybody – foreigner or countrymen - who stands in their way.

The third lesson is that hope is not a method. The notion of a pain-free occupation should never have taken root in the minds of US policy-makers intent on selling a discretionary war to an ambivalent public. Those gloating members of the Security Council who are now engaging in the rhetoric of multilateralism should take note. When they suggest that the internationalization of the mission will have the desired political effect, they are expressing a hope – not a certainty. Let us pray that their optimism is justified. Let us be prepared if it is not.

David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.

Copyright CISS 2003

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