 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
A setback for army transformation (September, 2005) By David Rudd
On 22 September Defence Minister Bill Graham announced the government’s intention to convert the army’s semi-retired air defence anti-tank systems (ADATS) into the multi-mission effects vehicle (MMEV). The intent, aside from completing the army’s transition to a virtually all-wheeled fleet, is “to significantly improve situational awareness by providing commanders with around-the-clock surveillance, and by sharing data and intelligence between vehicles and command posts.”
The $750-million program will see the grafting of the ADATS turret and electronics from the M-113 armoured personnel carrier onto the light armoured vehicle (LAV-3) chassis. It will also see the purchase of up to 13 LAV-based command posts and the installation of the new Link-16 communications system, enabling MMEVs to communicate with other services. Said the Chief of the Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, "The MMEV represents a significant step forward in army transformation. It will increase our efficiency, interoperability and deployability."
How so? Is there evidence to suggest that the MMEV represents good value for money? Will it enhance the army’s mobility and ability to work alongside key allies? More importantly, what is its relevance to the security environment in which the Canadian Forces are expected to operate?
As a ‘transformational’ program, the MMEV is of some merit. The ability to engage both ground and air targets using the same vehicle, and at ranges of up to 8 km, makes for a formidable capability. But the program falls short on so many other critical fronts as to make it a dubious choice for an army struggling with persistent budgetary hardship.
Multi-Mission Effects Vehicle -- picture curtsey of Oerlikon Aerospace
The CF is quite rightly pre-occupied with the challenges of strategic mobility. But since the only way to transport the MMEV and its accompanying vehicles is by sea, or by allied or chartered airlift, the costly transfer of the ADATS turret and electronics to the LAV-3 chassis seems wholly unnecessary, as the latter offers no weight savings over the M-113. The MMEV will not be transportable on the CC-130 Hercules – at least without the partial dismantling of the turret assembly. But 15 years of expeditionary operations have shown that the transport of Canadian armour aboard the Hercules is a non-starter.
From a tactical perspective the MMEV may also be redundant. The army intends to amalgamate different platforms into a ‘direct fire unit’ of approximately regimental strength. This will involve the procurement of both the Mobile Gun System (MGS) and the LAV-mounted version of the tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile. MMEV will be the third part of this triad. But with the MGS and LAV-TOW the service will have potent anti-armour/anti-fortification capability. Adding MMEV would conceivably give it the ability to prosecute targets at longer ranges, but there seem to be preciously few scenarios in which Canadians gunners will have an unobstructed field of view for 8 km. Only the deserts of the Middle East offer such opportunities, and Ottawa has steadfastly refused to send Canadian troops to war there. If, on the other hand, they become embroiled in the urban areas which characterize the ‘3-block war’, fields of view could shrink to only a few hundred metres. This is hardly a place for MMEV, whose main virtue is its long-range firepower.
There is further evidence of redundancy. DND claims that MMEV will be able to provide situational awareness through round-the-clock surveillance. Is this not what the Coyote surveillance vehicle is for? Would not a portion of the $750-million slated for MMEV be better invested in allowing Coyote to transmit video images and other surveillance data back to higher headquarters in real time?
As if to stake out new operational territory for the MMEV, the DND announcement included a cryptic reference to its ability to strike targets behind hillsides using non-line-of-sight weapons. But none of the latter exist in the CF inventory. The procurement of, say, a fibre optic-guided missile (FOGM) might fit the bill but none are currently in allied service. It is therefore a statement against the ‘transformational’ value of MMEV that its effectiveness lies in a weapons package that either does not exist or may never exist.
Then there is the issue of cost-effectiveness. Clearly the direct fire support function can be more easily and cheaply accomplished by placing a more potent weapon on the LAV-TOW vehicle. (The American Hellfire, or its successor, the Joint Common Missile, are worthy of consideration). Alternatively, a cannon-launched missile (such as the Israeli LAHAT) could be deployed on MGS. In close-quarters fighting, the bunker-busting job is best left to cheaper infantry-portable weapons. Thus a third vehicle for direct fire support is truly an unnecessary expense (although since TOW has reached the limits of its design, the army could consider removing the LAV-mounted variant from service as the MMEV comes on line).
As Canada is the only NATO country to use ADATS there will be major cost disadvantages to keeping it in service over the duration of its lifespan. As with the other great ‘strategic orphan’ in the CF’s inventory – the Victoria-class submarine - no one will share in the system upgrade/development costs. No ally will be able to provide logistical support for the vehicle’s weapons systems in the field. Thus the MMEV fails a critical interoperability test.
From a strategic standpoint, the necessity of maintaining a three-vehicle fleet for direct fire support in the post-Cold War era is dubious. While stationed in Europe the army fielded two vehicles for direct fire support: the Leopard tank and, later, the TOW Under Armour variant of the M-113. If two vehicles were judged adequate to fight Soviet tank armies, why does the army require a total of three vehicles (including two missile-carriers) for ground support in today’s strategic climate? Clearly, any post-Cold War operational scenario will be considerably less target-rich than the Fulda Gap of the 1980s.
Likewise, it could be argued that the new security environment casts doubt on the importance of maintaining a surface-to-air capability to protect formations of Canadian ground troops. Current policy dictates that Canadian Forces will never deploy outside a coalition. The Defence Policy Statement effectively terminated the commitment to furnish a brigade for coalition operations. Henceforth, only 1,200-person 'task forces' will be dispatched overseas. With such a small in-theatre footprint, it seems reasonable to expect that allies could take responsibility for the defence of coalition airspace.
And herein lies the real rub. While the defence statement stresses the need for combat-capable forces, it does not even entertain the possibility that Canada could be fighting anyone other than guerrillas and insurgents in the years ahead. General Hillier has said repeatedly that we face not “the bear”, but rather “a ball of snakes”. Such parties fight asymmetrically; their ambush/hit-and-run tactics call upon small arms, light weapons and improvised explosive devices. They do not field (sizeable) armoured forces. They do not have unmanned air vehicles or cruise missiles, let alone air forces. Therefore, from where does the requirement for long-range direct fire originate? From where does the requirement for ground-based air defence originate?
(ADATS’s only claim to utility was the 2002 Kananaskis summit of G-8 leaders, whom it protected from errant private aircraft. But surely if a domestic security requirement truly exists, there seems little justification for upgrading the system and transferring it from M-113 to LAV-3 at such enormous expense to the taxpayer.)
Air Defence Anti-Tank System -- picture curtsey of Oerlikon Aerospace
MMEV represents an admirable effort to squeeze the last drop of performance out of sunk costs. But is this item a necessary addition to the army’s inventory? The aged system has won no foreign orders, nor does it have any prospect of doing so. Inter-operability with key allies will not be enhanced by its acquisition. The vehicle is meant for tasks that need not be undertaken, given the opposition Canadian troops are expected to face in the future. It offers only incremental improvements to the army’s other direct fire support platforms, and is likely the most expensive way of neutralizing ground targets. Finally, it will offer no strategic mobility improvements over its tracked predecessor.
A $750-million project that does not serve the purposes envisioned for the army in the Defence Policy Statement, and which does not provide substantial return on investment cannot in all good conscience be allowed to proceed. A vehicle that is clearly meant for symmetrical operations is not consistent with army transformation; it has no place in the CF inventory in the era of fourth-generation warfare.
Clearly, someone has not thought this through.
David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.
Copyright CISS 2005
