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To kill or to vote: Freedom of choice comes to Iraq (January, 2005)
by David Rudd
It was a stirring speech. In his inaugural address on January 20 George W. Bush articulated the idealism that colours US foreign policy; an irrepressible optimism that all nations would some day embrace the principles of liberty and plurality enshrined in the American constitution.
Brows furrowed the world over as viewers reminded themselves of the uneven way in which America has tried to export its most cherished values. The compromises with unsavoury regimes, and the realization that democracy has been a high priority only when values and interests coincide, cast doubt on the president’s faith that “the fire of freedom” will “reach the darkest corners of our world.”
Nevertheless, something along those lines is happening in a region not known for liberty or pluralism. Afghans recently held their first national elections. The process was judged to be relatively free and fair, and President Hamid Karzai has brought members of quarrelsome ethnic tribes into his government. Dissident Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives still lurk in the background, but the overwhelming public desire for peace after 20 years of war has, for now, isolated them.
Likewise, Palestinians have endorsed a political platform which favours an end to corruption, cronyism, and the achievement of statehood through violence.
Iraqis are going to the polls and will choose a government that, for the first time in decades, will not be lethal to them or to their neighbours. This is but a tentative step toward democracy; only in a prolonged period of civil calm can democratic institutions be fostered. But elections are no mean feat in a culture which, historically speaking, has had little affinity for them.
The process is not without its critics. Many are concerned that voter intimidation and the under-participation of Iraq’s Sunnis in the election will undermine the legitimacy of whomever wins. Washington had come under pressure to delay the vote until the insurgency could be tamed, and to facilitate that goal by announcing a timetable for a complete withdrawal from the country.
Neither would have been likely to improve the precarious situation that now prevails. A delay would have emboldened the insurgents, giving them more time to plant bombs and shoot candidates. At best, US and Iraqi forces can contain the insurgency, so time is not a factor. A credible post-conflict strategy could have stabilized Iraq, but the time for that has passed.
That notion that extra time would have coaxed Sunnis out from their frightened, surly political self-exile assumes that the absence of violence would have made this possible. Many might not vote even if the streets are quiet, knowing that a relatively free and fair election would only confirm their minority status in the new political order.
There are fewer reasons to doubt the legitimacy of the vote than the nay-sayers have alleged. Those who freely decline to participate as a way of protesting the entire process cannot complain if their views are not represented. Participation in Western elections hovers at roughly 65 per cent, but no one questions the legitimacy of the exercise. Iraq’s Sunnis compose 20 per cent of the population. Even if they abstain (a most undesirable possibility), the overall voter turnout can still produce a fairly legitimate result.
By definition, elections produce minorities as well as majorities. The key is how these minority views and interests are accommodated. They are not in tribal dictatorships, but they can be with democratic institutions. This is why a delay in the election is a bad thing for Iraq. It means delaying the promulgation of a constitution (due on August 15) that recognizes, protects and empowers ethnic or sectarian minorities. Sunnis need not feel themselves singled-out or condemned to political isolation. Kurdish and Turkomen minorities are aware that they will be junior members of a new parliament, but are eager to cast their ballots anyway.
The election is being challenged on other grounds. It has been suggested that the new government will lack legitimacy because it must rely on foreign military forces to extend its writ around the country. True, cooperation with occupation authorities is politically damaging to any would-be government. But the absence of full sovereignty is the result of more than just poor pre-war planning by Washington. It stems also from and a vicious insurgency gripped by the warped logic that killing police officers and national guardsmen - two of the trappings of sovereignty - is to everyone’s benefit.
This in turn has sparked debate as to whether an immediate and wholesale US and coalition withdrawal would cut the legs from under the guerrillas. The logic is attractive but wrong. The insurgency is composed of different factions with different objectives. Soft nationalists will tolerate a continued but sharply reduced US presence, at least for awhile. Hard nationalists want to see the back of the occupier and return Iraq to Sunni dictatorship, but otherwise have no truck with those wishing to put an Islamist face on the body politic. The portion of the insurgency that is both radical and fundamentalist is likewise not interested in delaying the election process, but in scuppering it entirely, since the notion of a secular state is offensive to them.
The point is that different groups with different goals make it virtually impossible to placate them all. An end to the occupation is an issue around which all can unite, but there the consensus ends. Soft nationalists may yet embrace a type of democracy, so long as they feel that they are in control of its evolution. Pragmatic, they will co-operate in the training of indigenous security forces, if only to hasten America’s departure. By contrast, the hard core will be unimpressed by an immediate or a phased withdrawal, or attempts to create multi-ethnic security apparatus in the service of all Iraqis. Eager to regain power, they will not only try to see off the occupier, but will turn their guns on each other and any Iraqi bold (or foolish) enough to preach moderation and reconciliation.
How can this hard core be neutralized?
The election has the potential to satisfy disparate demands. A government with reasonable sectarian representation will have a better chance of persuading the Baathists and jihadists that there is an alternate path to achieving a political voice. With a popular vote behind it, the new 275-member parliament will be in a position to insist that a timetable for the coalition withdrawal be sketched out. Recent statements from prominent Shia leaders that they will not seek to impose an Iran-style theocracy will go some way to placating nervous Sunnis. So will their commitment to bring Sunnis into the government – essential to the writing of the constitution. Finally, if the presidency is offered to the Sunni incumbent, Ghazi al-Yawer, his sect will have less reason to fear being marginalized.
This may be wishful thinking. Iraq has been on the road to full sovereignty for some time, and yet the kidnappings, summary executions, and bombings have continued unabated. Home-grown militants, backed by fighters from elsewhere in the region, have freely chosen to make life hell for their own. They cannot claim to be unable to distinguish between civilian and military targets. Consequently they cannot absolve themselves of responsibility for the chaos they have sown, even if some Western observers are ready to give them a pass.
Nor can the querrillas deny that they would abridge the fundamental human right to have a say in one’s own governance. That undemocratic regimes in the region would shrug this off is understandable. That so many Westerners have chosen to be mute, rather than express solidarity with Iraqis in their first real moment of choice, is lamentable.
Paradoxically, the election’s most ringing endorsement has come form the unofficial head of the insurgency. In a taped statement last week, Jordanian-born Abu Musab al-Zarqawi declared war on “this evil principle of democracy.” The rejectionists may answer his call. But their decision to pursue their aims through the most sinister means possible - rather than to campaign, debate, vote, and march for them - de-legitimizes and disenfranchises them more than any quasi-democratic election ever could.
David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.
Copyright CISS 2005
