Hopes that the early hand-over of power to an interim Iraqi government would enhance the willingness of allied nations to render meaningful assistance to Iraq’s reconstruction were recently dashed in Istanbul. Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Association failed to agree on a motion put forth by Washington and London that would have made the training of Iraq’s security forces a central mission of the Alliance. To add insult to injury, US President George W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair lost a battle to deploy the NATO Response Force (NRF) to Afghanistan to bolster security in advance that country’s first democratic elections in September.

The president’s assertion that trans-Atlantic ties were on the mend could not mask the enduring discord between the Anglo-American axis and the Iraq’s war’s opponents, led by France and Germany. The major allies are adrift on an ocean of mutual suspicion and recrimination, their ability to speak politely to each other strained to the breaking point.

The double blow to US policy comes at a crucial moment for Mr. Bush. Facing diminishing public support for the US military presence in Iraq, the president sought to give Paris and Berlin what they had been asking for - an end to US political pre-eminence in Iraq – in exchange for help stabilizing the country. The two European powers had hinted that assistance would be contingent on American ceding control to an Iraqi administration or a UN-backed authority. But despite having seen off the Coalition Provisional Authority and its embattled head, Paul Bremer, neither is willing to follow through with troops.

This is hardly surprising given the level of violence and the contempt in which most foreign forces are held by the Iraqi populace. French President Chirac’s assertion that a NATO presence would not be understood by the Iraqi people has some merit. But as the request comes not only from Washington or London, but from Iraqi Prime Minister Iyad Allawi, Mr. Chirac’s reticence to pitch in seems curious. The Iraqi leader would not be floating the idea if it did not have a critical mass of support in the new government.

France’s categorical refusal to send troops whatever the circumstances suggests that its commitment to Iraq’s transition to stability and democracy was little more than rhetorical. For the time being Paris will do nothing to aggravate or improve Iraq’s lot. The same policy - do no harm, but seek no rapprochement - will likewise form the basis of Franco-American relations for the foreseeable future.

By the end of the summit, the White House had to make do with half a loaf. The leaders stated cryptically that they would consider Iraqi requests for training assistance. But no agreement on where the training would take place, who would be responsible, or the scope of the assistance provided. As a result of Franco-German objections, no central (eg. NATO) control of a training program will be possible. Nor is it likely that more than a handful of Iraqi police and army officers will be tapped for foreign instruction. Whereas an in-country program would have been able to train hundreds of security personnel at a time, a relative few will pass through the military academies of the two European powers. Maybe.

Behind the political tug-of-war lurks yet another round of plotting and intriguing. The Bush Administration’s appeals for unity have been carefully crafted to recruit the support of allies who, although nervous of Washington’s intentions, were traumatized by the souring of relations before and after the war and eager to see things return to normal. The early hand-over of power and the call for help by Mr. Allawi’s government were clearly intended to broaden international support for Iraq’s reconstruction. To Paris, such moves must have seemed little more than a continuation of Washington’s efforts to divide and rule European public opinion, not to mention a way of extracting American from the mess it had created.

Thus instead of a vigorous discussion on how best to promote long-term peace and security in Iraq, the summit should be regarded as a thinly-veiled game of diplomatic one-upmanship. This time it was the French position (shared by Germany) that prevailed. With NATO all but sidelined, Mr. Chirac boosted the prospects that the much-discussed European Security and Defence Policy would finally be forged among the anti-war allies and gradually displace the Atlantic alliance as the preferred vehicle for regional security. Continued instability in Iraq will work to France’s advantage in two ways: it will drive the American ‘hyper-power’ back into its lair, and be the catalyst for the emancipation of Europe from the United States.  

To that end, it was essential for France that little progress be made in bolstering NATO’s presence where it was arguably most needed. Stung by the Iraqi setback, Messrs. Bush and Blair turned their recruiting efforts to Afghanistan, where a persistent failure of NATO nations to ante up troops and equipment to bolster the stabilization force there has drawn criticism from no less a figure than UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. His NATO counterpart, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, tried to put a brave face on an agreement to bolster the force from 6,500 to 10,000 personnel, knowing that most allies weren’t enthusiastic about an expansion of the existing commitment.

True to form, France threw a wrench into the recruiting drive, refusing to countenance the deployment of the robust NRF to Kabul and its environs. This may have been a step too far, as even the anti-American French daily Le Monde labelled Mr. Chirac “a killjoy”. Regardless, continuing disagreement over how best to secure Afghanistan’s hard-won gains seemed less of a matter of principle and more one of pettiness.

For its part, Canada reaffirmed its unwillingness to extend the presence of its 2,000-strong garrison through September’s elections. Pre-occupied with the federal election, Ottawa was effectively detached from serious debate on what risks Canada is prepared to run to see stability preserved at the most crucial moment in Afghanistan’s history. The pending withdrawal comes at a doubly inopportune moment. A resurgent Taliban has launched deadly attacks on foreign aid workers, and on those tasked with registering Afghan voters, the goal being to sew the seeds of political chaos and arrest the slow crawl toward democracy.

Come August, the Canadian military presence will shrink by two-thirds, casting doubt on the Liberal government’s commitment to its ‘Peace and Nation-Building Initiative’. But it is not only the electoral process that requires protection. A Canadian working to clear rural areas of deadly anti-personnel landmines left over from previous wars expressed frustration at NATO’s, and Ottawa’s, apparent lack of resolve. Attacks on foreign workers had obliged him to hire Afghan militiamen to keep watch over him and his colleagues, thereby financially empowering local warlords. He would have much preferred teaming up with Canadian or other Western forces, but none seemed willing to venture too far out of their bases, let alone into the countryside.

As with the training program in Iraq, the stabilization force in Afghanistan was the offspring of feigned consensus. It was established as a result of the allies to agree on something – anything – at a time when disharmony over the US-led war threatened to fatally undermine trans-Atlantic ties. The force was thus a compromise on many levels, resulting in inadequate troops numbers and a mandate that restricted them to little more than routine patrols intermittent support to Afghan security forces. Add to this the restrictions contributing nations place on their respective contingents and one is left with a symbolic presence ill-suited to both the size of the country and the scope of its problems.

NATO was established in 1949 to shore up Western democracy by keeping totalitarianism at bay. However grudgingly, the allies agree that this is the ultimate goal in the struggle against terrorism. Discord over Iraq should not cause the leaders of the great liberal democracies to lose sight of this. In reality they may be starting to.

David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.

Copyright CISS 2004

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