Any lingering doubts about George W. Bush’s commitment to the great democratic experiment in Iraq were put to rest on 12 April. In a sombre yet defiant address to the White House press corps, the president re-committed America to a medium-term presence in the country, parts of which have been rocked by inter-communal violence and, more recently, by guerrilla warfare.

At the same time, doubts about the president’s grip on the political reality facing the US and its Coalition partners were raised to a new level. In his mid-evening pep talk, Bush sought to downplay the political significance of the uprising which has claimed the lives of scores of Americans and hundreds of Iraqis. He declared that the fighting was localized, and branded the insurgents as thugs, terrorists and enemies of freedom. He was partly correct. Turmoil in the Sunni Triangle and in the suburbs of Baghdad – where one is apt to be fired upon or taken hostage by militiamen loyal to dissident Shia cleric Moqtada al-Sadr - does not constitute a nation-wide revolt.

But beneath the bravado lurked a palpable sense of unease at both the strength of the resurgent opposition and its potential to stymie Washington’s plans for a smooth hand-over of power. Sunni militias – previously thought to be vanquished – are fighting with renewed vigour under what could be considered a unified command structure. The emergence of a small yet troublesome Shia front illustrates that Iraq’s largest religious sect is not wholly content to give the Coalition a free reign in determining the composition of the transitional government.

Most telling was the president’s disinclination to answer questions from the assembled journalists on how America would deal with the upsurge in violence. Time after time Bush responded by referring to the insurgents as terrorists and power-grabbers whose conduct was at odds with the democratic aspirations of most Iraqis. While boldly declaring that US field commanders would get the resources needed to put down the insurrection, there was no acknowledgement that the Administration’s assumptions about the pacific nature of post-war Iraqi society were almost all wrong. Sheepishly, Bush finally accepted what his intrepid Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, could not: that the occupation force was too small to provide basic security for the citizens of Iraq. (The rotation of forces has now been adjusted, slowing the departure of US-bound troops while their replacements join them in country.)

Bush’s unsophisticated performance burned bright when asked how and to whom power would be transferred at the end of June. With such an important date looming on the near horizon, one would think that the Administration would have some idea of who would assume responsibility for day-to-day governance. That no individual or grouping of individuals sprung to the president’s mind reflects his detachment from what is arguably the most critical issue in US foreign policy today. With a shrug, he raised the possibility of accepting whomever the UN Special Envoy deemed most fit to exercise interim leadership. After months of pretending otherwise, it was a subtle yet unmistakable acknowledgement that the Administration is fresh out of ideas, and that it cannot control the outcome. 

Even if the president could find the political strings to pull, it is not clear that he would succeed. All indications are that Iraq’s internal politics are grossly misunderstood by the White House. For months the American presence had co-existed uneasily with the ambitions of the Shia majority and its de facto leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The latter has been content to see a Coalition presence in Iraq as an insurance policy against postwar chaos. But this ‘welcome’ was contingent on the transfer of power from the Iraqi Governing Council to a new entity chosen by direct elections in which the Shia were sure to dominate. America’s insistence that such elections be postponed until a voters’ list could be drawn up, and that minority rights be entrenched in Iraq’s interim constitution, has done much to convince the Shia that the US is intent on thwarting their bid for a controlling stake in the new Iraq.

The recent violence should therefore be seen as part of a chess game - not between rival Shia factions, but between the between al-Sistani and Washington. In order to reign in al-Sadr, America must choose whether to confront his militias in their urban redoubts, and risk widespread civilians casualties and the public condemnation that goes along with it, or to beat a path to the ayatollah’s door, requesting that he exert a pacifying influence on the entire Shia community. Al-Sistani may do so, but not until he gets what he wants – namely an ironclad guarantee that the US will not obstruct Shia efforts to assert power after the handover on 30 June. If direct elections are still not possible, he will insist that the successor authority will have to be heavily weighted in favour of his sect. Precisely how (or if) the restive Kurdish and Sunni communities will reconcile themselves to this new reality is decidedly unclear.

In choosing not to address the complexities of the situation in his speech, President Bush leaves the impression that the Administration is either oblivious to the sources of violence, or is hoping that the militants will simply present themselves for destruction, thereby relieving the pressure to comply with Shia demands. Either way, he is underestimating the shrewdness of al-Sistani and the commitment of his followers. The old cleric may not share al-Sadr’s impatience with the pace of political change. But he must be secretly thanking the young firebrand for giving America a taste of what happens to those who stand in his way.

And even if the militias impale themselves on American bayonets, they will still have seized the political initiative. Further unrest could rally more restless Shia to the colours, and more American casualties could tempt the Administration to cut its losses and transfer power to a hastily constructed governing authority with no legitimacy in the eyes of those over whom it is expected to rule. The lifespan of a provisional government would be measured in weeks, if not days. Without an indigenous security apparatus to enforce civil order, Bush’s grand plan would come crashing down, leaving the most ruthless elements in Iraqi society to pick up the pieces.

Which makes Bush’s descent into incoherence and evasion all the more worrisome. Responding to critiques of his obvious lack of planning for the postwar stage, he maintained that freedom was the inevitable outcome of last year’s invasion, as if liberal democracy would effortlessly implant itself Iraq’s blood-soaked soil. Hubristically citing freedom as America’s gift to the world, the president gave no hint that a truly ‘free’ Iraq could choose to be as hostile to America as prewar Iraq.

US forces have little choice but to fight their way into cities to restore order. There may be contempt for the occupation, but unless American power is respected, however grudgingly, the insurgents will be emboldened to create further mayhem. But even in defeat the so-called freedom-haters may still have the upper hand. Although a military victory against the Coalition is unthinkable, a political defeat is still possible. In electing to personalize the counter-insurgency effort, the US has enhanced the prestige of al-Sadr and invested too much of its own in bringing one man to heel. In the Arab world, symbolism matters as much as substance. Failure to get him will foster perceptions of American weakness. An emboldened insurgency will exploit this. With Iraqi security forces still too immature to take on the insurgents, there will be little standing in the way of total anarchy.

Iraq’s instability is not wholly Washington’s fault. Small groupings of Iraqis who might otherwise have agitated peacefully for political change have made a conscious choice to turn their cities and neighbourhoods into a charnel house. Their actions serve only to slow the pace of reconstruction and delay an end to the occupation.

But the chief architect of Iraq’s present seems adrift in a rose-tinted ether. Bush’s vision for the country and the wider region may be compelling, but without an honest account of his policy’s shortcomings, he will be unprepared for the surprises that the next few months will almost certainly have in store.

A leader who walks the international stage relying only on his instincts will see nothing - even in the full light of day. A new dawn will soon break over Iraq. It will take more than clichés and blandishments to keep America on course, and to rally external support for a smooth transition to democracy. In striving to liberalize the Muslim world, President Bush is has shown himself to be a gambler. But as the occupation wears on, the risks he is taking look less and less calculated. As June 30 approaches, chess, not Risk, should be the order of the day. 

David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.

Copyright CISS 2004

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