Every summer in Britain, as city-dwellers head off for their August vacation, the media takes a partial break from 'serious' news. In what is commonly known as 'the silly season', coverage of the larceny, rascality and chicanery of the rich and (not so) powerful mixes with political and celebrity gossip, testifying to the need for even the most dour news-addict to revel in the lighter side of life.

As the stresses and strains from the 'war on terror' mount with each passing week, one can perhaps forgive America from indulging in its own rather silly season. But absurdity isn't to be found in the voyeuristic coverage of the sexual assault trial of basketball star Kobe Bryant. Nor does it reside in Arnold Schwarzenegger's eccentric gubernatorial bid in California. Rather, it comes in the form of two puzzling ideas concocted by the US Department of Defense.

The first - a proposal to use financial markets to predict the likelihood of terrorist attacks on US and Western targets - died a quick and unceremonious death in July. The project's embattled front-man, former Iran-Contra indictee John Poindexter, resigned his position rather than draw fire for heading up a program that would have allowed up to 10,000 investors to place bets on when the next political assassination, aircraft hijacking, or embassy bombing would occur. Media pundits took much delight in the irony of entrusting the ethically challenged with a program so ethically dubious.

The second idea is still on the table. It envisions the construction of small nuclear weapons, or 'mini-nukes', packing a fraction of the punch that levelled Hiroshima 58 years ago. They are being studied by Pentagon planners as possible antidotes to one of the most pressing security challenges of today: the need to halt and roll back the proliferation of weapons of mass effect (WMEs).

According to some US defence policy-makers, America's arsenal of strategic nuclear weapons - configured to keep the old Soviet Union at bay - do not represent an effective deterrent to the possession or use of WMEs by unstable regimes. The latter, it is argued, will be more inclined to use nuclear, biological or chemical arms because, like Saddam Hussein, they cannot be dissuaded by superior military strength. They may believe, with good reason, that America would never employ its most powerful weapons in response to the mere acquisition of WMEs, or in a conflict which does not directly threaten the US homeland.

There is support in the US Congress for this school of thought. On May 21 the Senate voted to lift a ban on research and development of a new generation of tactical nukes. The House of Representatives will consider a compromise that would allow research but not development.

To be sure, counter-proliferation is a laudable goal. The attraction of hiding WMEs in old mineshafts or purpose-built bunkers deep underground - out of reach of conventional munitions - should be obvious to the leader of any 'rogue' state. But the drawbacks of using low-yield nukes as tools of counter-proliferation are simply too numerous for this plan to be worthy of serious consideration.

As America is already a declared nuclear weapon state, the introduction of a new class of nuclear arms would not explicitly violate the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But doing so would be counter-productive to Washington's efforts to arrest the spread of nuclear arms. It will not be possible to preach nuclear abstinence to say, North Korea or Iran, while simultaneously expanding one's own arsenal.

The introduction of low-yield weapons (measuring 1 or 2 kilotons versus the 15 kilotons of the Hiroshima bomb) would have a tangible effect on nuclear disarmament and efforts because, in order to verify the functionality of the devices, a rigorous testing program involving computer simulations and actual detonations would have to be carried out. There is nothing inherently wrong with the former. The latter, however, would undermine the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty to a degree not seen since the 1995 French nuclear tests in the South Pacific.

True, this flouting of international norms did not estrange France from its key allies. But a new round of American nuclear tests would come at a very inopportune moment. By signalling its intent to become even more militarily self-reliant, America could further de-couple the trans-Atlantic security ties needed to stabilize Iraq and prosecute the war against terrorism.

The adoption by the US of a tactical nuclear war-fighting strategy might have other unintended consequences. It would likely be seen as confirmation that America was prepared to go to extreme lengths to preempt all perceived threats from WMEs. If so, it could provide recalcitrant states with a reason to acquire nuclear weapons to deter preemption. To be fair, they may do so even without Washington's example - in response to local security concerns. Pakistan may see the utility of sub-strategic weapons as a countermeasure to India's superior conventional military strength. Even 'threshold' nuclear states may find them attractive. A 'discreet' nuclear weapon mounted atop Iran's new Shahab-3 ballistic missile might enable Tehran to strike Israel without wreaking havoc on neighbouring Muslim populations.

The comparatively low yield of the proposed weapons would blur the line between conventional and unconventional warfare, challenging the informal taboo that the West has placed on the use of nuclear weapons since 1945. This existential concern exists alongside a more practical one concerning the efficacy of such weapons. According to Stanford University nuclear physicist Dr. Sidney Drell, even a 1-kiloton weapon would throw a million cubic feet of radioactive dirt into the air without even reaching a bunker 300 metres down.

A successful strike on a rogue state's cache of unconventional weapons would rely on accurate intelligence as to the location and contents of the storage facility. Given the inability of the US Central Intelligence Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency to locate Saddam Hussein's banned arms before the commencement of hostilities, a preemptive strike with a small nuke would be risky in the extreme. Firms which manufacture bunkers might be persuaded to point out the site on which construction took place. But even if there was no doubt as to the location of the facility, the astute rogue could ensure that it was constructed in or around population centres. Since collateral damage resulting from a tactical nuclear strike would be unavoidable, the attacker would either be self-deterred from using such weapons (in which case they become useless) or be forced to confront a low probability of success combined with the ignominy of irradiating an area the size of a small town.

And if Washington decided to take that chance? International public opinion requires that care be taken to ensure that the target state can speedily recover from its wounds (witness Iraq). The burdens of modern conventional warfare - the damage to strategic natural resources and critical infrastructure, not to mention human life - are already too heavy for many to bear. The use of radiation-producing weapons is sure to have even greater negative effects on post-war reconstruction and development.

Clearly, the proposed nuclear option is symptomatic of a tendency (not confined to America) to seek a technological solution to a problem that is only partly technological. But as with the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missile technology (which has spawned efforts to create a missile defence grid), the spread of WMEs is an issue requiring a multi-faceted response. Vigorous diplomatic engagement of unstable regimes, combined with economic incentives and disincentives to wean 'rogues' off their nuclear habits, have as much a role to play in diffusing the threat as the application of military power. Indeed, such techniques may yield better results when one has little real leverage over the proliferator. There is no palatable military option to deal with a nuclear- and missile-armed North Korea. There is at least a forlorn hope that the six-way talks between the 'Hermit Kingdom' and the US, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia will put a verifiable end to the North's weapons programs in return for economic assistance and a normalization of diplomatic relations.

Should diplomacy fail - and the success of the six-way talks is far from assured - there are still non-nuclear ways of achieving counter-proliferation goals. Advanced conventional deep-penetrating munitions have not reached the zenith of their development. (The free-fall weapons which destroyed the lower levels of a building in which Saddam Hussein was thought to be hiding during the opening stages of the recent war were not even specialized for earth penetration.) Research into rocket-powered munitions with enhanced kinetic abilities, combined with novel explosive mixtures and hardened casings have received comparatively little attention from defence scientists.

There is also scope for innovative uses of existing technologies. During the first Gulf War, old battleship gun tubes were filled with conventional explosives and dropped from large aircraft in a series of hastily-organized tests. The terminal velocity and outer strength of the makeshift bombs caused them to bury themselves several metres in the earth before the downward force of the blast was triggered. Although this rather primitive approach to bunker-busting would not have the desired effect of reaching hundreds of feet down into a reinforced concrete storage facility, multiple hits on the same impact point could clear away initial debris, deepen the crater, and pave the way for an lethal blow - all without the harmful side-effects of a nuclear detonation. If the target was still not obliterated by this artificially-created earthquake, one can be reasonably sure that access to the bunker and its contents would be sealed off indefinitely.

America's concerns over the proliferation of dangerous technologies are well-founded. Creative ways of addressing those concerns must be thoroughly explored. But these should not include a tactical nuclear option. Until the political ground is fertile for universal nuclear disarmament, the centrality of nuclear arms in the defence plans of all nations must be restricted, not expanded. Mini-nukes make little sense in political terms and even less sense in practical terms. Cooler heads in the Pentagon and in Congress should regard this idea in the same way as the market-based approach to terrorism forecasting - the unfortunate product of a particularly silly season.

David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.

Copyright CISS 2003

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