 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
Nature’s weapon of mass destruction (September, 2005) By David Rudd
No one can say that they didn’t see it coming. Unlike a super-terror attack on a major city, the storm which blighted the city of New Orleans and the Gulf coasts of Mississippi and Alabama was tracked from its origins and swept ashore only a short distance from its expected landfall. Only its impact was under-estimated, and America is none the better for it.
Estimates of 10,000 fatalities have been making the rounds. Given that the city, lying below sea level and wedged between a lake and a major river, filled up like a bathtub, this grim forecast may be accurate. One can only hope that the death toll will be far lower, just as the initial casualty estimate from the World Trade Center collapse proved, mercifully, to be far higher than was actually the case.
It will be some time before we know the reasons behind the alleged tardiness of the response to the disaster. But a chilling link has already been drawn between the pre-occupation with terrorism and the loss of an entire city and a portion of its (mainly poor, African-American) population. This seems a little much. As the Economist trenchantly observed, building a large in such a climactically vulnerable area was a roll of the dice worthy of one of New Orleans’ best casinos. Mother Nature would have come to a reckoning with ‘The Big Easy’ (and Biloxi and Mobile, etc., etc.) at some point.
Not that the scale of the disaster would not have overwhelmed even the most sophisticated emergency plans. Today one can hardly conceive of the total destruction of a city. Hence it is difficult to envision the scale of either the evacuation or the rescue challenge. Yet many feel that this is within the capability of mortal man. As shown by the disgruntled citizens of New Orleans, modern society is conditioned to expect instant gratification. Relief is expected to be immediately at hand.
That may not be realistic, but it is understandable given the size of the US public security apparatus. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the regular and reserve components of the US military, the American Red Cross, plus the various state and local emergency management bodies make for a formidable disaster-response capability (and an equally formidable bureaucracy). Even with much of the National Guard in Iraq, there were sufficient forces available to keep local law enforcement from breaking down. But quantity is useless without quality leadership. This seemed to be lacking among federal, state and local officials, who did not move decisively until many hours after the storm had passed.
That those unfortunate enough to be trapped in the city were left unattended to for days does not speak well for either the mayor of New Orleans, who did not activate his city’s disaster plan (school buses meant to evacuate immobile citizens went unused and were left underwater), or the governor of Louisiana, who did little to push the National Guard into affected areas. It also casts doubt on the relevance and efficacy of the investments Washington has made in securing the homeland since 9/11. Claims that ‘the richest country on earth’ had failed its own citizens speak as much of frustration as fact. It didn’t help that on his first trip to the area President Bush could do little more than flash his trademark grin and pledge that things would get better. For the poor, sick, starving, and homeless, it was a patronizing substitute for real action.
It was also a wake-up call to national security planners the world over that Mother Nature can wield a bigger stick than al-Qaeda. Did preparations for the next terror attack divert too many human and material resources away from the perils of the annual hurricane season? Did pre-occupation with exotic threats blind federal officials and emergency planners to the mundane? Difficult to say. But revelations that the canal dykes which divert the water around New Orleans were too weak to withstand a Category 4 storm and, further, that it was previously judged too costly to reinforce them, will bring the hellfire of public opprobrium down on the heads of state and federal decision-makers. By some estimates the cost of shoring them up was a mere $1.5-billion – a paltry sum considering the scale of the damage to life and property, and a silent rebuke to the untold billions spent on counter-terror and border security.
Not that the latter are irrelevant to the security of the United Sates, or Canada for that matter. The attacks of 9/11 arguably did more to upset the American psyche and the tide of global politics than any natural disaster of this or the last century. A similar attack would throw a wrench into any attempt to moderate America’s go-it-alone approach to international security. But one possible legacy of Hurricane Katrina is that it will cause a tectonic shift in America’s perceptions of where its most pressing security needs lie. Uncertain over the course of events in Iraq, and increasingly aware (and resentful) of the cumulative cost of underwriting the security of ‘allies’ in Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific Rim, the American public may be susceptible to a Clintonesque appeal to ‘come home’, succour their own wounds, and leave matters of state to the tender mercies of others.
But that is America’s debate. If the storm highlighted our neighbour’s social and political shortcomings, what lessons are there for Canada? If the letters to the editors of the major Canadian dailies are anything to go by, Canada’s best defence lies in the collegial nature of Canadian society, which, so goes the theory, would not fracture along socio-economic lines if subject to the forces of nature. No racial group would be left behind following an earthquake or flood, nor would there be widespread looting or gunplay amid the rescue effort.
There is some evidence for this. My own recollections of the great blackout of 2003 was of a city that came together rather than apart. The citizens of Toronto took advantage of the time off work, rather than each other. But it is also true that this was a relatively minor incident. The sheer scale of a (real) disaster could undermine the bonds that we self-righteously claim to be the great levee between us and civic chaos. Survival is, after all, ingrained on the DNA of all living things. Under extraordinary circumstances the civilized pretences of humanity can dissolve with barely a whimper.
The Liberal government acknowledged as much when it tabled Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy in February of 2004. The stated goal was to pursue a set of initiatives to “protect Canada and the safety and security of Canadians at home and abroad.” A cursory glance at the document suggests that reliance on civic-mindedness and personal goodwill will not suffice.
One year later, the public can be forgiven for being unaware of the plan’s existence. For those inclined to inform themselves, they will be heartened to know that the government’s “key achievements” include the review of anti-terror legislation; the establishment of a “Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security” to ensure that the concerns of Canada’s various ethnic communities are represented when security matters are debated by parliament; the near-establishment of an Advisory Group on National Security, and; the proposal for a model for a National Security Committee composed of select parliamentarians.
Leaving aside the fact that all these files are incomplete, it is clear that Ottawa’s priority lies in countering terrorism. This is not a bad thing. Canadians rightly demanded (and are getting) action on that front. But as a terrorist attack could put tremendous strains on the emergency response capability (police, fire, medical, hazardous material disposal) of any Canadian city, planners should be aware that, regardless of the cause of the catastrophe (natural or man-made), many of the services required to manage the consequences will be similar.
To its credit, Ottawa has established an office to enable the creation of ad hoc emergency response teams composed of volunteer health professionals geared to assisting local officials in times of crisis. In the wake of the 2003 SARS outbreak, money has been allocated for better front-line medical care, and for a mass immunization strategy. Federal, provincial, and territorial ministers responsible for emergency management have set up a permanent high-level forum on civil emergencies. But the National Security Policy is still heavily weighted in favour of counter-terrorism, and has made little headway on the protection of critical infrastructure (i.e. energy grids, pipelines, hospitals, water treatment facilities). The evacuation of a major urban centre is not even contemplated!
The Canadian navy is taking up relief duties in the northern Gulf of Mexico, bringing supplies in ships designed for patrol rather than support duties. The 35-year-old supply ship HMCS Protecteur, veteran of the 1991 Hurricane Andrew relief mission, recently failed post-refit trials and is not considered seaworthy. This is tangible proof of how a decade of beggaring the Canadian military has left us and our allies vulnerable to forces that can be foreseen but not controlled, let alone avoided.
One is left to wonder how an earthquake on the lower mainland of British Columbia would tax the patience of the citizenry and the resources of the various levels of government. Would Canadians also demand instant gratification? Most definitely. Would they get it? Doubtful. The movement of emergency personnel to communities along the B.C. coast affected by the tremor would take time. The lack of airlift would impede the deployment of personnel and of heavy equipment to clear rubble and restore sanitation, electricity, and access to main thoroughfares. The lack of sealift would effectively cut off many coastal communities from immediate help. Amazingly, the recently-released defence policy statement makes no provision for the acquisition of either capability.
Is the government prepared, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, to look seriously at these capabilities, or will it elect to be a perennial ‘free rider’ on the American security bandwagon? One plausible scenario suggests that the latter would be a mistake. As the shifting of tectonic plates along the Pacific coast could affect all urban areas between San Diego and Seattle, the Americans would be too busy to render assistance. Allied nations would fare no better; their search-and-rescue teams and contributions to the Canadian Red Cross would come well after the fact. Canada would be on its own. The first 72 hours after the quake would see the greatest loss of life, in addition to the greatest acts of selflessness and heroism by ordinary citizens.
None of this is to be alarmist, or to make light of the considerable efforts that have gone into making Canada safe from the likes of Osama bin Laden. The point here is that no emergency plan is likely to survive its first contact with the enemy - be it a terrorist or a tempest. So as Canadians (and others) express schadenfreud at America’s predicament, and gleefully throw rocks at the Bush Administration for its apparent slothfulness, we would do well to re-assess our own vulnerabilities because it is only a matter of time until they are laid bare. The shortcomings of the National Security Policy and those of the Canadian military suggest that they already have been.
Terrorism occurs because humans choose to engage in it. Nations can defend themselves through good intelligence work and/or by lying low and offering the militants no offence. But one cannot choose whether or not a hurricane will come ashore, or whether an earthquake will strike. Hence the progress made in countering the extremists does not absolve Ottawa from its responsibility to make every effort (along with the provinces and municipalities) to ensure that the plans and tools are in place before natural disasters inevitably befall us. Mass destruction awaits even the most inoffensive nations and peoples. Mother Nature guarantees it.
David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.
Copyright CISS 2005
