 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
Canada's missile defence muddle (February, 2005)
by David Rudd
Prime Minister Paul Martin straddled the fence for as long as he could before finally, albeit reluctantly, jumping down on the side of those counseling against Canadian participation in the US ballistic missile defence (BMD) program.
Mr. Martin delivered the "no" in such a solicitous, apologetic fashion, that only a Canadian could have uttered the words. He was careful not to begrudge the United Sates its right to defence itself, nor did he reject the rationale behind the defence system. This is very significant in that he has conceded the day to BMD-phobic Liberals without explicitly embracing their view that missile defence is a dangerous game.
The PM desperately wants a majority in parliament, and did not did not want to jeopardize that possibility by fomenting a caucus revolt in advance of the upcoming Liberal convention. Like his predecessor, he did not order a made-in-Canada study on the immediacy of the missile threat. The decision, therefore, should be seen as one determined primarily by electoral politics than by an appreciation of the strategic landscape. His response, after all but endorsing Canada’s participation in April of 2003, may be incomprehensible to an American audience. But this is the Canadian way.
Mr. Martin justified his stance by saying that Canada has other defence priorities, as if to suggest that participation in BMD would preclude the fulfillment of the 23 February defence budget commitments. This was somewhat disingenuous, as there is no evidence that Canadian participation would have required massive outlays of capital. Suggestions that expenditures on satellites would be directly and solely related to missile defence are inaccurate. The technology Canada is considering would be deployed regardless if missile defence were an issue.
A further muddying of the waters occurred when Mr. Martin demanded that “sovereign” Canada be consulted before the United Sates acted against and incoming missile. Leaving aside the question of whether there would be time to do so, it is difficult to conceive of any circumstances under which the US government would seek the approval of anyone outside the BMD tent.
Shortly before the PM’s announcement, Canada's new ambassador to the US, Frank McKenna, remarked that Canada would have some role to play in the system - this despite the government's insistence that no decision had been made. His statement, and the kerfuffle it caused, should be viewed as the consequence of Ottawa's decision not to engage Canadians directly on whether Canada’s security would be enhanced or diminished by BMD. When the government absents itself from national discussion on key issues, confusion and ambiguity are the inevitable result.
But Mr. McKenna was correct. It is indeed misleading to suggest that Canada will be completely divorced from the missile defence effort a result of Thursday's announcement. Canada is a member of NORAD. Part of NORAD's mandate is to detect missile launches and track the missile to its intended target. These are the first two steps in the interception process. Thus as long as Canada is a member of NORAD it will have one foot planted firmly on the playing field. Indeed, Canada’s foot has been there since the first Soviet missiles entered service decades ago. To pretend that we are (or will be) virginal when it comes to ballistic missile defence is tantamount to self-delusion.
One senses is that by saying "no" so politely Mr. Martin has defused a small bomb - but only a small one. Had he delivered a "no" in a truculent or defiant fashion, had he threatened to lead an international crusade against it, Washington would have taken much more interest. That's not a good thing.
As it is, the Bush administration will mutter to itself and get on with the job. Canada’s support was desirable on practical as well and political grounds; it makes sense for NORAD’s warning and tracking functions to be married with the interception function. But American officials have known all along that the decision ultimately facing Canadians was not whether to acquiesce to the inclusion of the system within NORAD, but rather how they would reconcile themselves to a decision that was, to all intents and purposes, Washington’s to make.
Canadians will now have to assess the security implications of our response. Will relations be plunged into the deep freeze? Probably not. Will they remain harmonious at all levels? Difficult to say. Will the US agree to install a partition at NORAD Headquarters, separating the joint warning and attack assessment infrastructure from the interception capability? It seems improbable that Washington would tilt even further at Canadian political windmills – especially given the obfuscation and meandering that have characterized Ottawa’s position on the issue. Will Ottawa consent to the expansion of NORAD’s mandate in 2006 to include coastal defence? If it does, should this be seen as merely a fence-mending gesture or the result of a sober appraisal of Canada’s security interests?
Anyone who claims to know precisely how this will affect Canada-US relations over the long term must be able to get inside the heads of future administrations and congressional leaders. An impossible task to be sure, although the renewal of NORAD in 2006 should give some clues as to whether lasting damage has been done.
Canada's position on BMD is analogous to the conscription crises of the two world wars. Back then, the issue of compulsory military service was so contentious that the government feared an internal revolt. Thus the mantra, "Conscription if necessary, but not necessarily conscription." Fast forward to the BMD muddle of 2005 and you have "Participation if necessary, but not necessarily participation."
Only a Canadian could have forged (fudged?) such a compromise. Mr. Martin could have done worse. But he could also have done better.
David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.
Copyright CISS 2005
