Was it a military tragedy or an industrial accident?

Three sailors from the newly-purchased submarine HMCS Chicoutimi were overcome by smoke during the boat’s maiden voyage on October 5. A member of the crew, Lt(N) Chris Saunders, succumbed to his injuries en route to an Irish hospital. Now questions are being raised as to the wisdom of buying second-hand equipment, and whether Ottawa’s inattention to the defence portfolio played any part in the incident.

If the latter allegation can be passed off as gratuitous partisanship, the serviceability of the boat at the time of its hand-over is very much at issue. In a meeting with his British counterpart, Canada’s defence minister Bill Graham wisely refrained from opining on the cause of two on-board fires that forced Chicoutimi to the surface and left it bobbing helplessly for three days in a North Atlantic swell.

But speculation is as human an impulse as breathing, and already observers are floating theories about whether the vessel was not properly reactivated by the British, whether the actions of the novice Canadian crew were to blame, or whether the electrical problems which caused the fires could have been foreseen by either the former or the new owners.

A board of inquiry comprised of naval officers with the requisite technical expertise has been convened. It will interview the crew and survey the damage to the submarine. The Canadian Forces’ ombudsman and parliament’s own standing committee on defence will broaden the scope of inquiry and ensure the integrity of the investigative process.

It remains to be seen whether the UK Ministry of Defence  (MoD) will conduct its own investigation. As one of the two parties responsible for the reactivation of the boat (the other is a large private sector conglomerate, BAE Systems) the MoD has an interest in the outcome, even if Canadian officials formally accepted the boat and considered it seaworthy. Any allegation of shoddy workmanship at the shipyard opens up the possibility of legal (and financial) liability on the part of the seller.

It will be interesting to view the results of these two notional inquiries, as the investigators will be interviewing the same people and sifting through the same wreckage. As is often the case, different conclusions can result even from the same set of facts, and parallel inquiries may end up absolving their respective nationals from blame.

Odds are, however, that the two allies will agree that the fire was an unfortunate accident for which liability cannot be assigned. The case will be relegated to the back burner as the buyer and seller negotiate terms for the boat’s repair. Meanwhile, as a precaution, the Chicoutimi’s three sister subs have been confined to port. Some regard this as a tacit admission that the entire class is unsafe. They would do well to recall the frequent groundings of the Sea King helicopter fleet for relatively minor, non-fatal incidents.

Although it will come as cold comfort to the family of the deceased or the shipmates he left behind, the accident was, in historical terms, hardly catastrophic. The Chicoutimi was salvageable and the number of casualties was low. Compare that to the loss of the American submarines Thresher (1963) and Scorpion (1968) with all hands. The Soviet Union’s submarine loss record was decidedly worse. The sinking of the Russian guided-missile boat Kursk in 2000 demonstrated the enduring risks for those who toil in obscurity even after the Cold War.

But toiling they are, and amid the grief and bewilderment back in Canada are questions regarding the utility of the submarine service at a time when the threats to this country’s maritime security originate primarily on the surface of the oceans rather than beneath them.

True to form, the navy has made a strong case for the retention of underwater vehicles, arguing that submarines are ideal for covert surveillance of illicit surface activities. Smuggling and over-fishing can be reported to other government departments tasked with the enforcement of Canadian laws. Subs can enhance maritime sovereignty by penetrating northern waters, cruising under broken ice fields where surface vessels lacking ice-strengthened hulls fear to tread. On-going maritime boundary disputes with the US and Denmark, and the possibility of increased commercial shipping in the Arctic, demand a year-round presence in waters Canada claims to be its own. It is cheaper to do so with a submerged platform manned by 50 or 60 sailors, versus a navy frigate with a crew of 225, or an unarmed coast guard vessel with few enforcement powers.

Climatic conditions are of no consequence to submarines on patrol. Unlike surface ships or aircraft, which have difficulty staying on-station and carrying out their duties in stormy weather, a submarine can remain on duty for weeks riding serenely below the waves. Overseas missions could include the passive detection of vessels trying to subvert a sanctions regime or run UN-mandates blockades. The mere possibility of a quiet diesel-electric submarine in foreign waters is enough to change an adversary’s calculation of how freely he can move about his own coastline.

Such are the practical and theoretic advantages of submarines – so long as they are well maintained and manned by experienced crews. The safety of the Canadian submarine service is excellent, but technical glitches have bedevilled Chicoutimi’s three sisters following their hand-over from the Royal Navy. Meanwhile, allegations from retired submariners that the training program for the new boats was abbreviated in order to meet an arbitrary in-service date suggests that top navy commanders may have ordered them to sea without the necessary work-up periods.

The relevance (or lack thereof) of these issues to the incident last week will come out in the wash. In the meantime, Ottawa is red-faced with embarrassment and frustration over a program that was supposed to yield a critical military capability at minimal cost and with minimal fuss.

Provided that Chicoutimi and her sisters can be repaired, the project will still have been cheaper than buying brand-new vessels from Swedish, French, or German shipyards. Yet the relevance of the underwater patrol capability is still one for policy-makers to consider as Ottawa prepares its long-awaited (and inexplicably delayed) defence and foreign policy reviews.

Having left the defence and foreign affairs departments to drift for the past five years, the Liberals have pledged to restore vitality to both with new political direction and additional resources. Political guidance will be of greater importance than money, since a sober assessment of the domestic and international security environment is the surest way to avoid policy failure.

Will the review conclude that Canada’s maritime security demands a manned underwater surveillance and control capability? For all their strengths, the subs are restricted in what they can do. Their invisibility and stealth are less of a virtue when there is a need to ‘show the flag’ in home waters. They cannot conduct boarding operations or arrest law-breakers; this task is best left up to surface vessels. They are not likely to engage errant Portuguese fishing trawlers for poaching turbot.

They cannot decisively influence events ashore by launching precision-guided weapons. Nor is it likely that they will be duelling with enemy subs in home waters or overseas. The Soviet Navy is no longer a threat, while the fast, well-armed, nuclear-powered boats of the US and Britain will likely be the first allied vessels to be committed to foreign combat missions. Even if Canada swallows its traditional reluctance to involve itself in shooting wars with emerging regional powers, there is probably sufficient anti-submarine capability in the surface navy and in the air force to complement the efforts of allied submarine fleets.

Will Canadian sovereignty suffer if the four boats are retired while still in their prime? Difficult to say. As long as foreign submarines remain out of sight while in Canadian waters, Ottawa is unlikely to cite them as threats to Canada’s sovereignty. For a government ambivalent about its security obligations and leery of additional defence expenditures, the less said the better.

The Liberals have quite happily postponed tough decisions on how the Canadian military should be re-capitalized to ensure its relevance and effectiveness in the twenty-first century. Given that the many mishaps involving the Sea King helicopter did nothing to accelerate the replacement of that geriatric machine, it seems unlikely that the Chicoutimi tragedy will be a catalyst that will focus cabinet attention on the well-documented plight of the armed forces.

To be fair, it would be imprudent to base policy or force structure on a single, spectacular mishap. Nor can it be argued that accidents never happen aboard brand-new ships. They can happen anytime, anywhere, and not as a result of political inaction or neglect.

But the fact remains that the second-hand boats were purchased because the navy could not afford new ones. This is a budgetary matter that once again highlights the perpetual unwillingness of the government to reconcile limited resources with varied and unceasing demands on the Canadian Forces.

How to properly balance these two imperatives is a matter best left for a time when emotions have cooled. For now, let the board of inquiry report. Let parliament have its say. And let the family and shipmates of Lt (N) Saunders know that the sacrifice both he and they have made was not in vain.

David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.

Copyright CISS 2004

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