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Disaster assistance: How should Canada spell 'relief"? (January, 2005)
by David Rudd
The tidal surge which thundered across the Indian Ocean on 26 December swept away more than those unfortunate to be within is lethal radius. According to some pundits it also carried off any pretensions Canada had to being in a position to respond rapidly to large-scale catastrophes.
Although the Canadian military’s Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) is now on the ground in Sri Lanka, providing medical care and fresh water to the stricken population around the town of Ampara, Ottawa has drawn flak for the apparent tardiness of the team’s deployment.
Is the criticism fair? Are there ways to improve the situation so that victims of the next tsunami, cyclone, or super-quake receive basic, life-preserving aid in a more timely fashion?
First, some perspective. There is more to disaster relief than the mobility of a few engineers, medics, and logisticians. Canada was not alone in the aid effort, and the survivors were not likely offended that the first-responders wore American or Australian uniforms. For them, it is the speed and quality of the aid that is key; the country providing it is of less importance.
Secondly, although the initial delivery of aid seemed ad hoc, this can be attributed not to the paucity of outsiders, but to the lack of an overall co-ordinating authority, which prompted individual nations to step into the breach. Not until last week’s donor conference in Jakarta, Indonesia was the United Nations formally recognized as the lead agency for relief.
Thirdly, the lack of any credible early warning mechanism such as that which monitors seismic and tidal activity in the Pacific played a role in the initial impact. Prudent investment by all countries bordering the Indian Ocean in some simple preventive measures might have reduced the scale of the carnage. But even had there been such a system, did the countries affected have the requisite communications infrastructure in place to warn their citizens – particularly those inhabiting isolated islands and coastal areas?
Since Mother Nature will always surprise us with her ferocity, countries must take some precautionary measures to ensure that they are forewarned and forearmed. Some estimates place the cost of establishing and maintaining the Pacific early warning system at a mere US$20-million – well within the collective budgets of South Asian nations.
That said, are there ways in which Canada can enhance the agility and quality of its response to future crises? Few would doubt the wisdom of ensuring that reputable non-governmental organizations are adequately funded from the outset. Many of these are already on site and able to stay well beyond the time when the attention of sponsoring governments begin to wane.
The military’s role is more problematic. The task is not as simple as throwing more money at DART. Canada could have the most agile armed forces in the world, with its own fast sealift and airlift and all the personnel required to succour the wounds of stricken countries. But unless a timely political decision is made to deploy – and this seems not to have been the case – then the value of a force structured for rapid response is diminished.
To be fair to Ottawa, a timely decision can be of little consequence if the recipient country cannot decide what it needs and where the donor’s aid should be targeted. Still, while there are many variables outside of Canada’s control, should they have been allowed to keep DART out of the game until well into the second period?
Clearly, the small reconnaissance team whose job it is to gain a preliminary understanding of the aid challenge should have been deployed within 24-48 hours. (It is unlikely that any country in the region would have objected to a few uniformed Canadians dropping in to pave the way for a more concerted effort.) Their departure should have coincided with the mustering of DART personnel at the latter’s base at Trenton, Ontario. The team could have been stood up, and, depending on the needs articulated by the reconnaissance team, remained on alert until Ottawa gave the go-ahead to deploy or ordered it to stand down. In short, these activities should have been concurrent, not consecutive.
This raises another issue. DART is not a standing unit, but rather a virtual unit composed of personnel from units scattered across Canada. Personnel are attached to parent units which, if already on deployment to, say, Africa, the Balkans or Afghanistan, render them unavailable for additional tasks such as disaster relief at home or abroad.
It is therefore incumbent on the government to take a hard look at military human resources. Clearly, Canada has some of the right people with the right mix of skills. The question is whether there are enough specialists to cover a number of missions simultaneously. It does not help that the skill-sets resident in logistics, medical, and engineering units are in high demand in the private sector, drawing people out of the service. As Ottawa contemplates how best to fulfill its election campaign pledge to add 5,000 persons to the military, special consideration should be given to the recruiting and retaining of young people in these vital support trades.
As for material resources, it would be impractical to consider the acquisition of Russian-built cargo aircraft, as some have suggested. Transport Canada requires Canadian owners/operators to certify every nut and bolt, tracing them back to their original suppliers. The process is so costly and complex that no allied nation has considered it a serious option. And securing a reliable supply of spare parts is a crap-shoot, as India discovered after buying Sukhoi fighter aircraft from Moscow.
Nevertheless, improvements to the military’s fixed-wing and rotary-wing transport capacity are clearly in order. New or leased transport aircraft could lift aid over the ocean, from which it could be trans-shipped by helicopter into isolated interior areas.
Proper military helicopters (not the civilian pattern Griffons foisted on the air force back in 1992) would have their uses beyond disaster relief. The lack of heavy-lift choppers hindered NATO’s stabilization operations in post-Taliban Afghanistan. It also left Canada red-faced, as the military had sold its big Chinook helicopters to The Netherlands in 1995.
(The Chief of Defence Staff-designate, Lieutenant-General Rick Hillier, is believed to support an improved helicopter capability, but not the purchase of long-range transport aircraft. His views are thought to be based on the notion that Canada will always have ample time to get to a crisis area. This is fine if the military has six months with which to prepare for a peace support operation, but it won’t suffice in the event of a natural disaster.)
As much of the world’s population lives in or near coastal areas, sea-borne disaster-relief capabilities should figure higher in future Canadian defence planning. Ottawa has given verbal support to a project to build a trio of navy support ships with a limited ability to pump aid ashore, but the first hull will not go into the water until 2012. It will take Canada longer to build a ship than it took to fight the Second World War.
A better idea would be to split the support ship program in two. Buying a couple of bare-bones auxiliary vessels to support the navy while at sea would cost little in terms of money or manpower. The savings could be channelled into a dedicated amphibious support ship for missions in coastal areas – including disaster relief.
When Prime Minister Martin proclaimed that rendering assistance to the needy was “the Canadian way”, he may inadvertently exposed the gap between ambitions and resources. To be sure, monetary donations from public and private sources will go far in helping the region to regain its footing over the long term. But in order to ensure that the tsunami victims have a future, Canada must help them secure their present.
Some carefully-targeted investments in relevant military capabilities, coupled with a streamlined decision-making process and a more generous foreign aid budget, could put real iron in the prime minister’s words. It would help diffuse the perception that Canadians can only react to tragedy, not prepare for it.
Canada’s international security policy must be driven by foresight, not guilt. With the right tools at hand, the “Canadian way” would truly be an example for all to follow.
David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.
Copyright CISS 2005
