Rumours of major re-structuring of the Canadian Forces surfaced last week, as word leaked out of Ottawa that the Martin government was contemplating an enlargement of the Canadian army to deal with frequent international peace support operations. The move would allegedly come at the expense of the navy and air force, which allegedly stood to lose a quarter of its front-line ships and aircraft. Surplus military basses might also be on the chopping block.

The doom-and-gloom prompted the normally unflappable Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), General Ray Henault, to go before reporters on Monday to deny that he would be robbing Peter to pay Paul. He denounced statements by unnamed military officers who had roundly condemned the cuts to the navy and air force as the price for a Liberal campaign promise to add 5,000 new soldiers to the army.

Dissension in the ranks

That the CDS would be ordered to conduct an impromptu press conference is highly unusual. He would not have done so without the say-so of the defence minister, or of the prime minister himself. Evidently further cuts to front-line capabilities are a sensitive matter for the government.

It needn’t have worried. Alterations to Canada’s defence posture have almost always involved cuts. It is highly unusual for the government to enhance capacity in one area without reducing it in another. It seems clear, though, that many high-ranking officers have become so peevish with the government’s disinterest in their plight – namely lack of progress in developing a new, forward-looking defence policy backed up by commensurate resources - that they felt compelled to indirectly influence the political process by revealing the government’s plans to the media. It is a matter for debate whether their gamble was a matter of indiscipline, frustration, or high-mindedness.

In any event, General Henault’s denial that a major re-alignment was in the offing is unlikely to survive his final year as CDS. The cuts are coming – perhaps not next year, but soon after. They will be driven by at least four factors: the $1.5-billion operating deficit  facing the CF; the imminent obsolescence of major equipment sets, and; competing fiscal priorities, and; a growing feeling within governing circles that the Canadian military should be configured for operations short of war.

Nor can the CDS rely on the fallacy that the cuts will not happen because the defence minister had promised additional resources. The minister can make no such assurances without cabinet approval. This he does not have.

So, does the government’s denial of imminent cuts hold water? Does the plan to give precedence to the army make sense in the current security environment? Will the proposed re-structuring put Canada in a better position to deal with risks at home and abroad, or is it a shell-game which will leave us worse off than before?

And why is all of this being considered behind closed doors, without the benefit of a policy review?

Shell-games?

Adding roughly 5,000 troops to the army is an idea which has been proposed by many analysts and international organizations, including the United Nations and NATO. The Secretaries-General of these two eminent bodies have long argued that member states have the obligation to maintain sufficient useable professional forces (versus semi-trained conscripts) to contribute to global conflict resolution. Since these crises invariably take place on land, it stands to reason that land forces should be given additional resources. Since the stabilization of failed states can take years and demand constant rotations of troops, the expansion of professional armies makes some sense.

During the election campaign the Liberals stated that the extra bodies would form a fourth brigade. There was no word on whether this would require yet another military base and a full suite of equipment. Given that the army’s existing three brigades are demonstrably under-strength, a better idea would be to fill out their ranks with the promised extra personnel.

Precisely how the proposed re-structuring will be financed is unclear. Dropping some aircraft and ships (and their crews) from the order of battle would not have paid for 5,000 extra bodies and their equipment. The $1.5-billion operating deficit - the result a decade of switching funds form the capital portion of the budget to operations in order to pay for a decade of overseas missions- has made the re-capitalization of relevant capabilities virtually impossible. If internal re-allocations are inadequate, extra money is needed. Where would this come from?

Military base closures are long overdue. With a standing force of 55,000, Canada maintains enough infrastructure to support 100,000 personnel. This drains scarce resources from equipment replacement and the recruiting and retention of skilled operators. But a minority government will be loath to alienate constituents around bases, even if they are no longer militarily essential.

Similarly, a minority government juggling the demands of opposition parties is unlikely to be able to find much additional money for army expansion. So where does this leave the election promise? Clearly, jettisoning parts of the navy and air force is the only way forward.

Could this be safely undertaken in the current security environment? The alleged 25% percent cut to the CF-18 fighter fleet could perhaps be justified by saying that Canadian airspace, while certainly vast, requires fewer planes to secure than it once did. The government may feel (but will not say publicly for fear of harming relations with allies) that it would rather devote these resources to (compulsory) domestic air operations rather than risk the political fall-out of sending them abroad to participate in (optional) coalition operations.

This critical distinction  - between obligatory and discretionary missions - may determine the fate of the navy’s three destroyers. The ships form the core of multi-ship task groups, allowing Canada to command allied flotillas and to protect them from long-range attack. Dropping these flagships would thus curtail the government’s ability to play a ‘leadership role’ on the international stage. But since the protection of home waters is the first and inescapable duty of any sovereign state, Ottawa can argue that an overseas naval presence, while desirable, is no longer an absolute necessity.

Such reductions will have a knock-on effect. The loss of the destroyer means Canada will require fewer helicopters then the 28 the government plans to purchase to replace the old Sea King. Nor will the navy necessarily require new support ships to provide long-range afloat logistical support.

Policy by stealth

Does this notional re-alignment of Canada’s armed forces reflect a hidden strategic agenda, an effort to surreptitiously re-orient the Canadian military toward a domestic or, at best, continental defence posture? Perhaps. Ottawa may be betting that ‘safe’ tasks - sovereignty protection and the policing of our maritime approaches - are all that Canadians want their military to do. While the proposed expansion of the army suggests that a robust overseas role is still something of a priority, the rationale for it – enhanced ability to undertake open-ended peacekeeping operations – suggests that in the future Canada will only concern itself with the ‘softer’ side of military operations.

But if Ottawa is confident that it can sell this new strategic paradigm to the public, why not disclose the options under consideration as a way of fostering public debate? Clearly, major alterations to Canada’s defence effort should flow from a thorough and open review of defence and security policy. Why has Defence Minister Bill Graham has ruled out public input into these matters before the government’s ‘International Policy Review’ is tabled this fall?

A defence effort that involves cuts to one or more of the armed services, and that puts the security of the homeland ahead of a ‘forward presence’ may be the best of a bad series of options. But citizens need to feel a sense of ownership over policies enacted in their name. If the proper structure and role of the CF in the post-9/11 world does not have even a semblance of public approval, it will serve neither the homeland nor Canada’s wider international interests.

And if Ottawa is counting on secrecy or public indifference to push through reforms, it is bad politics as well as bad policy.    

David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.

Copyright CISS 2004

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