Introduction

In urging Canada to become involved in Darfur, many politicians and activists have cited the need for Canadian forces to restrict themselves to ‘traditional’ peacekeeping missions. But is Darfur simply a matter of separating ‘Arabs’ from ‘Africans’? In many ways the conflict in Darfur is simply a new front in an ongoing civil war pitting the majority periphery against the Nile Valley Arab minority that rules Sudan from Khartoum. The failure of two of the three major rebel factions in Darfur to sign the Abuja peace agreement by the 31 May deadline does not bode well for the return of peace to the region any time soon.

Canada and Darfur

Although the extension of Canada’s mission in Afghanistan to 2009 would seem to preclude any extensive Canadian military involvement in Darfur, public and political calls for Canadian intervention persist. Part of the Canadian public believes that traditional peacekeeping is the main function of the military. But an intervention in Sudan has the potential to be even bloodier than the mission to Afghanistan. 

Canadian understanding of the issues in Darfur has suffered from a proliferation of instant experts and political activists who create misleading models for the conflict based on misplaced fears of American ‘aggression’ in the region or a simple loathing for Arab Muslim regimes.  A number of organizations have emerged whose sudden preoccupation with events in Darfur has more to do with advancing their own agendas than genuine concern for a region their members know almost nothing about.  A recent column by the ex-editor of a Toronto daily was based entirely on the author’s bizarre belief that Darfur was in southern Sudan, hopelessly confusing the conflict in Darfur with the two decade-old civil war in the south. Following the publication of this column, several Canadian radio stations interviewed the author for his ‘expertise’ in the region.

A Deteriorating Situation

No attempt has ever been made to develop Darfur, though it was once a rich kingdom that supported a population much larger than it has now. There is now little infrastructure, no network of roads, and no electrical power in most places. Despite the peace agreement, the region continues to destabilize. The conflict has already crossed into Chad, where differences between the Chadian government and the Sudanese regime have assumed the form of a cross-border proxy war. Many of the region’s tribes straddle the old colonial borders.

Nearly all the leaders of one of the holdout rebel formations - the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) - hail from the Zaghawa Kobe, a sub-group of the Zaghawa tribe of African nomads that is mostly located in Chad, but has a small minority in the border region of Darfur. Chad’s leader, President Idris Deby, is also a Zaghawa. Deby accuses Khartoum of sponsoring the Chadian rebels who attacked N'djamena, the capital of Chad, in April. We are now seeing the same kinds of large-scale civilian massacres in Chad that have already occurred in Darfur. The cross-border conflict shows every sign of worsening, and will not be affected by the Abuja peace agreement. 

Darfur was the last region to be added to the modern Sudan, having remained independent until 1916. Its natural ties are with its neighbours in the Sahel rather than the distant Nile Valley. In the last twenty years Libya has had a growing influence in Darfur, thanks to the creation of a trans-Saharan road that provides a quicker and easier outside link for Darfur than the slow and difficult land routes to Khartoum. Libya’s leader, Muammar Qadafy, has proposed sending a team of investigators from the Community of Sahel-Saharan States to the Chad-Sudan border. Qadafy bears much of the responsibility for the present conflict, having encouraged Arab supremacism in the region in the 1980s. 

Osama bin Laden has even entered the fray, urging his Middle-Eastern followers to join the conflict on the side of the Sudan government (which does not want their help). Oddly enough, it would be easier for such fighters to infiltrate London than Darfur, where their different physical appearance and foreign dialects of Arabic suggest their clandestine arrival might as well be accompanied by a brass band. After centuries of inter-marriage, the Darfur Arabs are largely indistinguishable from the region’s African population. In some cases Arab janjawid marauders have had to ask potential victims whether they were Arab or African. 

An Elusive Commitment to Peace 

Although the signing of the Abuja agreement by the largest faction of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) looks promising, the movement is subject to divisions amongst its three main tribal components: the Zaghawa, Fur and Masalit. In addition, the SLA leadership is young, has difficulty asserting its authority, and leaves little room for the input of older and more experienced commanders. A divided leadership of questionable competence has inhibited the military success of the movement. The Islamist JEM, though smaller than the SLA, has more experienced leadership, is far better organized politically, and aspires to a national presence.

The role of the Sudanese army in restoring peace to the region is uncertain. The national army relies heavily on recruits from the African tribes of Darfur, and their early failures in fighting against the rebels and reluctance to strike at the civilian population were primary causes behind the creation of the janjawid. The various rebel groups include many veterans of the national army, as well as capable Zaghawa veterans of the lightning desert campaign that drove the Libyans from Chad.

The janjawid will be difficult to disarm (particularly by the government who armed them in the first place, as called for in the Abuja agreement). They do not have a place at the peace talks and are potentially unwilling to accept further direction from Khartoum if it is not viewed in their interest. Attempts to bring janjawid leaders to trial as war criminals (as called for in UN Security Council Resolution 1556) will likely result in clashes with UN peacekeepers. 

The southern Sudanese politicians who have joined the Khartoum government have declined to take a position of leadership on the Darfur issue. Their attitude marks a major break with the policies of their late leader, John Garang, who was always vocal in support of the rest of Sudan’s ‘African’ population. 

Despite international acclaim, a peace agreement signed by only one major faction of the resistance is basically worthless. The Abuja peace agreement does not contain any provisions for real power-sharing or revenue-sharing, and is vague about the actual means of determining land restitution and distribution. The Khartoum government is no doubt eager to implement such an agreement, which contains no actual mechanisms to fulfill its terms. In a sign of the insincerity of the central government’s peace offers, the depopulation of Darfur’s Jabal Marra region by government and janjawid forces continued even during the peace negotiations. 

Conclusion 

One of the quandaries of the present situation is that a settlement with the Khartoum regime that meets the aspirations of the Darfur rebels will likely spark fighting on a third front - Sudan’s eastern Red Sea Province. The local Beja Congress and other smaller organizations in eastern Sudan have long agitated for greater autonomy from Khartoum and receive material aid from Eritrea. A bombing in east Sudan’s Kassala state on 12 April was blamed on Darfur’s JEM as part of an effort by the western rebels to open a second front in the war against Khartoum. The example of the South Sudan’s long struggle with Khartoum and its consequent power-sharing agreement unfortunately points to violence as the only means of loosening Khartoum’s iron grip on the periphery. Ironically, just as Canada and the UN contemplate a peacekeeping mission in Sudan, Somali Prime Minister ‘Ali Muhammad Gedi is urging the intervention of a peacekeeping force of Sudanese and Ugandan troops in that strife-torn country. 

None of the observations above should be considered a call to do nothing to relieve the suffering of Darfur. They are, however, a warning that those Canadians urging the abandonment of the Afghanistan mission in favour of ‘peacekeeping’ in Darfur may be advocating Canadian military involvement in a widening and potentially lengthy conflict.

Political reform and a revival of traditional methods of conflict resolution are the keys to peace in Darfur. Canada has more to offer than just a military contribution; Canadian-style federalism has been suggested by some as an alternative to the present centralization of power in the Sudan by a small Nile-based elite. An uninformed and hasty commitment to further militarization of the region based solely on domestic political concerns and rivalries will do little to advance the cause of peace in Darfur.

Dr. Andrew McGregor is director of Aberfoyle International Security in Toronto and  is also the author of A History of Darfur. He can be reached at mcgregor116@hotmail.com

Copyright CISS 2006

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