Introduction

As the United States takes an increasingly aggressive role in the Islamic world as part of its ‘War on Terror’, its old Cold War rival has tried a different tack in the last year. Almost 5 years into a brutal campaign against the Muslims of Chechnya, Moscow has sought to replace confrontation with cooperation, though its approach has often been confusing and self-contradictory. With the spectacular growth of Russia’s all-important petroleum sector hindered by its poor relations with former Islamic allies of the Soviet Union (many of whom are important members of OPEC), the Kremlin has set out to restore an atmosphere of trust and cooperation. Years of warnings from President Vladimir Putin that Russia was on the verge of being engulfed by a new Islamic Caliphate have been replaced by an emphasis on Russia’s ‘multi-ethnic’ heritage, and the importance of Russia’s Muslims and Islamic legacy to the Russian state.

Russia’s recent efforts to be considered part of the Islamic world through membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) are undoubtedly directed at dealing with the Islamist threat at its source – Saudi Arabia and other pro-Western Gulf states.  Having identified Saudi Arabia as the key to improving its larger relations with the Islamic world, diplomatic exchanges between Russia and the Kingdom intensified over the last year. All the efforts of the Kremlin may have been squandered, however, by the ill-advised assassination in Qatar of a former Chechen president, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev.

The new Saudi-Russian relationship is one of convenience and necessity. The Kremlin saw an opportunity to cut off funding for the Chechen rebellion at its source. For Saudi Arabia, there was the prospect of being able to abandon its perceived role as a sponsor of radical Islamist movements, part of a vast public relations campaign to reassert the kingdom’s credentials as a responsible ally of the West. The Kingdom’s rulers have chosen to take care of business over support for foreign adventures in remote Islamic rebellions, realizing that Russia’s emergence as a power-player in the oil-market must be addressed. Saudi Arabia and Russia are now the world’s first and second largest oil exporters respectively. For both sides, it was time to embark on a charm offensive, forgetting the antagonisms of recent wars in which Saudis and Russians have actually faced each other on the battlefield.

‘Islamic’ Russia’s diplomatic offensive

Russia’s first step in reconstructing strained relations was to make a concerted effort to join the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the Islamic world’s most important assembly.¹ President Putin’s attendance at the October 2003 summit in Kuala Lumpur was designed to renew old Soviet alliances with Muslim nations at odds with American policy. The world has changed significantly since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, and old Soviet allies like Egypt, Libya, Yemen and even Syria are now much more reliant on America’s good graces than Moscow’s. For all its posturing, Russia is no longer seen as a reliable counter-weight to American ambitions. Nevertheless, presenting Russia as a fellow ‘Islamic’ nation is a necessary step to defuse popular support in the Muslim world for jihad against kafir (infidel) Russia. Citing Russia’s 20 million Muslims, Moscow seeks permanent observer status and eventual full membership in the OIC.

In attendance with Putin at the summit was the late Ahmad Kadyrov, the Russian-backed winner of dubious presidential elections in Chechnya last year. Russian officials were not seeking to avoid the topic of Chechnya, but rather to advance the argument that Chechnya was returning to normalcy under the leadership of a democratically elected Muslim President. In this version of events, fighting continues only against ‘foreign mercenaries’ and ‘powers camouflaged by Islam’. The OIC and the Arab League were the only international organizations to send observers to Chechnya’s presidential elections. Their approval of the process perhaps said more about the standards of democracy in the Arab world than it did about the legitimacy of the Kadyrov government.

Islam was first given official recognition in Russia by Catharine II in 1789. Russian resentment and bitterness over centuries of Tatar rule in the Middle Ages has left Russia’s Muslims with little influence on the state. A legacy of Russian/Muslim warfare in the North Caucasus has also entrenched the popular notion of Muslim ‘savages’, hiding in the mountains waiting for an opportunity to murder upright Orthodox Russian soldiers. With ‘savages’ now replaced by ‘terrorists’, these perpetually fashionable images are the basis for most Russian views of the current struggle in the Caucasus. Yet the Russian president has recently observed:

Russian Muslims are an integral part of a multi-ethnic Russia, and we see the strength of our country in this inter-religious harmony… I said at the OIC summit, out of a deep belief, that terrorism has nothing to do with religions and nationality. We are against any clichés against Muslims. Anyone who equates Muslims with terrorism is an instigator.²

Having reached out to the Islamic world in the OIC conference hall, the Russian president then used an interview with al-Jazeera to remind the Muslim world that Russia was still capable of striking its enemies well beyond its borders. Expanding on Russia’s new preemptive strike policy, the President largely wasted the efforts of his diplomats in a clumsy version of George Bush’s ‘with us or against us’ speech

At times, Russia’s attempts to ingratiate itself with the Islamic world have been nothing short of bizarre. Shortly before the Coalition invasion of Iraq, Russia’s official leaders of Islam (nearly all Tatars) declared a jihad against the United States, with apparent Kremlin approval. Though nothing came of these proclamations of support for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, it was a signal that the Kremlin was now prepared to invoke Russia’s Islamic legacy as a tool of foreign policy.³

Financing a friendship

Trying to find common ground through decades of antagonism with Saudi Arabia has been extremely difficult. On his state visit to Moscow in September of 2003, Prince ‘Abdullah (the Kingdom’s effective ruler) had to look as far back as the Soviet Union’s early recognition of the Saudi regime to find an outstanding moment in Saudi-Russian relations. The May 2003 bombings in Riyadh were, however, a bitter reminder to the Saudi regime that the Islamic militants they had once successfully exported abroad had now turned their attentions to the corrupt royal family. The Islamists never made any pretence of their distaste for the Saudi regime, but it had always proved easy enough to provide a little money and direction to deflect them from the kingdom’s rulers. Many Saudi militants found their way to the front-lines of wars against Russia in Afghanistan and Chechnya. Frequently rebuffed in its attempts to improve relations with the United States in the post 9/11 world, the Saudi regime saw improved relations with Russia as an opportunity to display its new ‘anti-terrorist’ credentials. Among the first victims of the new Saudi attitude were the foundations that provided funds for the Chechen struggle. The Saudi regime also elicited a decisive religious ruling from the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Shaykh Abdul-Aziz al-Shaykh, to the effect that terrorist attacks are the work of ignorant and misguided individuals whose actions have nothing to do with jihad and are punishable under Islamic law.

There are other motivations for improving Russian/Saudi relations. Russia is interested in becoming a new home for Saudi investment, much of which has begun to shy away from the US and Europe in light of massive 9/11-related class-action lawsuits. This is separate from the promised Saudi investment in Chechnya, which is more in the way of a gift, since the Saudis are well aware that nearly all funds sent to Chechnya tend to vanish somewhere along official channels. The Saudi charities were encouraged to divert their funds from the Chechen mujahidin to the Kadyrov government, following the lead of the Islamic Bank of Development and the Saudi Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Reconstruction aid from Saudi sources formally goes through Moscow, but Kadyrov campaigned hard to have all such funds sent directly to his administration in Grozny. Kadyrov was equally eager to have control of the production and sale of Chechen oil transferred to Grozny from Moscow.

Russia is the largest non-OPEC oil producer and in the past has been known to take profits at the expense of OPEC efforts to regulate prices and production. Under bilateral agreements signed in September 2003, Saudi Arabia and Russia would work to coordinate oil prices while Russian engineering firms would offer new technologies to the Saudi oil industry in a set of deals worth a potential $25 billion. The Saudis were disappointed when Moscow explained that it would be unable to regulate oil production as OPEC countries do since private firms control most of Russia’s petroleum industry.⁴

Addressing the Wahhabi threat

Diplomacy occasionally offers rare sights, and among its most bizarre was Russia’s arch anti-Wahhabite, Ahmad Kadyrov, arriving to a warm welcome in the Wahhabite Kingdom of Saudia Arabia in January, 2004.⁵ The man who declared jihad against Russia in 1994 was thoroughly rehabilitated as a representative of Kremlin-approved ‘official Islam’. Kadyrov made the most of his opportunity to wear Saudi approval as a badge of Islamic legitimacy. Playing to the sensitivities of his hosts, Kadyrov actually downplayed the importance of Saudi fighters in Chechnya, something at odds with the purpose of his mission. Various representatives of official Islamic structures in the Caucasus accompanied Kadyrov to reinforce his credentials as the legitimate authority in Chechnya, including the Muftis (religious leaders) of Chechnya, Daghestan and Ingushetia.

In an effort to address the apparent contradictions in his visit to Riyadh, Kadyrov made a distinction between his Wahhabite hosts and the ‘so-called Wahhabites’ active in Chechnya. In reality, Kadyrov only added another layer of confusion to Russia’s Islamic policy – are we to understand that the problem with Russia’s ‘Wahhabite’ insurgents is that they are not sufficiently Wahhabite? Kadyrov walked away from his meetings claiming that the Saudis had given official recognition to his government, though the Saudis issued no statement to this effect. Kadyrov also made a radical proposal that was little noticed in the non-Islamic press, suggesting that Islamic authority be centralized in an international centre to be located in Saudi Arabia. This centre would be recognized by all Islamic countries and be responsible for issuing fatwa-s (religious decisions) providing correct interpretations of Islam.⁶ It seems likely that this was Kadyrov’s inspiration, rather than Moscow’s.

Russia staked an enormous amount of its diminishing credibility in the person of Ahmad Kadyrov. Daily reports of ‘disappearances’, torture and human rights abuses at the hands of Kadyrov’s pro-Russian militia undermined Kadyrov’s assertions of a return to normality and prosperity in Chechnya. The presidency as well is still challenged by Aslan Maskhadov, elected President in OSCE supervised elections in 1997. Maskhadov has often called for the death of Kadyrov while leading the Chechen resistance from the forests. Adam Deniyev, an earlier candidate for Kadyrov’s job, was blown apart while making a live television broadcast, and Kadyrov himself survived fifteen assassination attempts before being killed in an explosion at Grozny Stadium on May 9, 2004.  Moscow felt that Kadyrov, due to his background as former Grand Mufti, had a special credibility abroad; when making Kadyrov’s introductions at the OIC conference, Putin made sure to point out that Kadyrov was ‘on the other side’ in the 1994-96 conflict. The ex-Mufti’s own gratitude to Putin apparently knew no bounds; in January 2004 he insisted that the Russian constitution be amended to make Putin president-for-life.⁷ In the weeks before the stadium bombing Kadyrov’s Chechen militia were hard on Maskhadov’s heels, hoping to announce his death as a gift for Putin’s May 7 inauguration. Kadyrov lost this deadly contest of Presidents, and will be extremely difficult for the Kremlin to replace. Kadyrov’s son Ramzan (now deputy leader), will be interested in the job, but his reputation for torture and murder may preclude this possibility. In a nation that practices blood revenge for such humiliations, Ramzan Kadyrov is himself a hunted man.

Riyadh never officially recognized Chechen independence after the 1996 Khasavyurt Accords left the small nation in a state of de facto independence. The failure of every Muslim nation but Afghanistan to recognize the government of Aslan Maskhadov remains a sore point in Chechnya. Ironically, Afghanistan’s offer of recognition was rejected by Maskhadov, though Yandarbiyev worked privately to maintain relations with the Taliban government. This rather tenuous Chechen-Taliban ‘link’ remains a mainstay of Kremlin propaganda. Much has also been made of the alleged connection between Arab volunteers in Chechnya and al-Qai’da, though no real evidence of such links has ever been offered. On the other hand, it is almost inconceivable that Saudi intelligence would not have operatives and contacts within the Arab mujahidin, who have been commanded by Saudi guerrilla-leaders since 1995.

Yandarbiyev, the Qatar-based former president of Chechnya and alleged financial point man for the Chechen mujahidin, was assassinated by a car-bomb on 13 February, 2004. With the diplomatic termination of official Saudi support for the Chechen cause, the bomb that killed Yandarbiyev appeared to seal off the pipeline for private and unofficial donations to the Chechen cause from the Gulf States. Two acknowledged Russian agents are now standing trial in Qatar for their participation in the attack, creating a diplomatic scandal with severe repercussions for Russia’s relations in the Middle East. The fact that Qatar is also a major command centre for US forces in the region has complicated relations between the two powers.

Holy War in Russia

Russia’s UN opposition to the invasion of Iraq was reinforced by Kadyrov, Russia’s new ‘Islamic agent’. Shortly before the 2003 Iraq War, Baghdad played host to a large delegation of most of the leading figures in state-approved Russian Islam, including Kadyrov. With the opening salvoes of the war, Kadyrov came to the defence of his friend Saddam Hussein, denying that there was any connection between Saddam and al-Qa’ida, while praising Iraq and Libya for their unwavering opposition to Islamist extremism.⁸ Aslan Maskhadov, however, pointedly denounced Hussein, Russia’s long-time ally and cheerleader for the Kremlin’s war on Chechnya. Even rogue warlord Shamyl Basayev hailed Saddam’s downfall as a chance for Muslims to emerge from tyranny.

While Pentagon and White House officials have inexplicably persisted in identifying Chechens among their opponents in the struggle for Iraq, a quick look at the respective attitudes of the Maskhadov camp of separatists and the Russian-loyalist camp of Kadyrov would suggest that any Chechens opposing the US must have belonged to Kadyrov’s Russian-sponsored Chechen militia. It is an absurdity, of course, similar to US claims that the tiny Chechen guerrilla army, pitted against the might of the Russian Federation, could spare an expeditionary force of their best fighters to defend their Baathist enemies in Iraq. The existence of a massive propaganda campaign (supported at the highest levels by the Russian, British and American governments) that places ‘fanatical’ Chechen jihadists at the front in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan has badly damaged international support for Chechen independence. Meanwhile the United States has chosen to publicly ignore evidence that Russian intelligence was cooperative with Saddam’s regime until just before the US invasion of Iraq, while maintaining fantasies of ‘Chechen terrorists’ active in Iraq.⁹

The inconsistencies in Russia’s new friendship with Saudi Arabia are evident as anti-Muslim pogroms and Wahhabi witch-hunts continue unabated within the Federation.  At the same time, Russian approval of a plan for the Saudis to finance a rebuilt Chechen education system promises new avenues of access for ‘Wahhabi’ beliefs. When given the opportunity, Islamists in other countries have consistently turned down ‘power ministries’ like defence or the interior, preferring control of the education and legal systems.  Russia’s relations with the world of Shi’ite Islam have been traditionally quieter, in part because there is no significant Shi’a community in the Russian Federation. Russia’s ongoing commitment to the Iranian nuclear program ensures that the Kremlin need not worry about Tehran’s support for Muslim insurgencies.

Putin’s rebirth as leader of the ‘multinational, multiconfessional people of Russia’ is unconvincing. The President has already created a strange amalgam of Soviet nostalgia and Orthodox tradition to which he now adds expressions of pro-Islamic sympathies. Orthodox patriarch Alexei II speaks glowingly of ‘the unification of the state and the church, the unity forcibly interrupted by the tragic events of the twentieth century’.¹⁰ The canonization of Russian soldiers who fell against the Chechens, and the highly visible presence of Orthodox military chaplains on the battlefield give Russia’s efforts all the trappings of its own ‘holy war’. The growing Orthodox influence in the Russian army comes despite the continued presence of large numbers of Muslim conscripts in its ranks.

Conclusions

Civic life appears to be spinning out of control in Russia as bombs become the main instrument of all dispute resolution, whether commercial, religious or political in origin. Even the Kremlin admits that ‘We are still not succeeding in preventing terrorist attacks which have increased by 50 percent in the past year’.¹¹ Despite evidence of the deep involvement of Russia’s security services and ‘mafia’ organizations in many of these activities, Islam remains the main culprit in the Russian popular imagination. Nationalist leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky has added the ‘Green Menace’ of Islam to his usual array of traditional bogeymen, which includes Jewish conspirators and ‘the Yellow Peril’.¹²

Putin’s claims that the breakup of the Soviet Union was a ‘national tragedy’¹³ and Russia’s new recidivist stance towards the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Baltic nations have alarmed many of those who had hoped for a permanent end to Cold War style superpower politics. Russian – US relations have begun to chill recently, and Russian media allegations of American involvement in the arrest of Yandarbiyev’s alleged assassins suggest a revival of Cold War distrust. In Russia’s current political climate there are few willing to address the consequences of its military adventures in the Islamic world. An exception is General Boris Gromov, (leader of the Soviet retreat from Afghanistan), who recently noted that: ‘The invasion [of Afghanistan] was a big mistake that opened the hornet’s nest that is terrorism, not only in Afghanistan but in the region as a whole’.¹⁴

According to Russian counter-terrorism sources neither the death of Yandarbiyev nor Saudi pressure on Islamic charities has stemmed the flow of funds to Shamyl Basayev and the Saudi leaders of the foreign mujahidin.¹⁵ Russia’s deputy prosecutor general has revived ‘the Wahhabi threat’, calling for prison terms for ‘those who practice Wahhabism, who run the prayer houses and preach the cannibal ideology’.¹⁶ Just before his death, Kadyrov was again calling for new legislation against ‘Wahhabism’.

The economic aspect of the new Russian/Saudi relationship appears as ill fated as the political dimension. Saudi expectations in the petroleum sector have not been met initially. Despite increasing centralized control of the oil industry in Russia, Moscow has done little to coordinate oil production with OPEC, jeopardizing the investment and development deals signed with Saudi Arabia last September. The Saudis remain wary of Russian efforts to become a major exporter to the US market, but still retain the upper hand in setting oil prices. Economic pressures could quickly undo the relationship forged between Russia and the Kingdom over the last year, and could even threaten Russia’s future participation in the OIC. So far the Saudis have made little mention of the Yandarbiyev affair; they may even prefer to ignore it. Unfortunately, it is the Saudi habit of denial that has placed them in their present precarious position. In the meantime the royal family risks further alienation from its subjects, many of whom regard the Chechen jihad favourably. In April 2004 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, a popular religious scholar based in Qatar, issued a fatwa that asserted the obligation of all Muslims to support the Chechen jihad.

Though the United States has made assassination part of its war on terror and has nodded approvingly as Israel targeted Shaykh Ahmed Yassin, it is unlikely to view the operations of Russian assassins lightly, especially when they occur near sensitive US military-bases. The assassination of Kadyrov, possibly in retaliation for the death of Yandarbiyev, is a serious blow to Russia’s attempts to renew relations with its old allies.  A year of foreign policy flux and uncoordinated activity have left Russia worse off than when it started, having earned the hostility of much of the Islamic world while acquiring the distrust of their would-be American allies in the ‘War on Terrorism’.

Dr. Andrew McGregor is an analyst with Aberfoyle International Security Analysis. He may be reached at mcgregor116@hotmail.com.

Copyright CISS 2004

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