One of the first foreign policy trials for Prime Minister Paul Martin will be mapping out a comprehensive vision for Canada-US security relations in the post-9/11 world. At their first meeting in Mexico, Mr. Martin and US President George W. Bush made some progress on the handling of suspect individuals, with the President agreeing to consult Canadian officials before deporting Canadian passport-holders from the United States.

But amid the bonhomie, Mr. Martin did not secure the President’s assurance that deported Canadian citizens would not be sent to third countries whose methods of interrogation and standards of incarceration are incompatible with Western notions of human rights. This indicates that there is lingering disagreement over how best to secure the North American continent from the scourge of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

But all is not gloomy. An emerging, if uneasy, consensus may be found in one key area. Canada is about to grit its teeth and enter into discussions with the US on a plan to create a ballistic missile defence shield covering North America. 

The plan to build two sites – one in California and one in Alaska – comprising ground-based missile interceptors and radars was conceived in the 1990s by the Clinton Administration, albeit at the behest of a Republican-controlled Congress. The justification was and is, ostensibly, to defend the continental US from long-range missiles fired by ‘rogue states’ – a euphemism for regimes that cannot be deterred from gross misbehaviour by America’s conventional and nuclear superiority. According to this school of thought, such governments are either too unpredictable to be trusted, or too unstable given the presence of radical elements who may one day seize power. Ergo, it is better to have an anti-missile system in place, as America would be able to defend itself while sparing the attacking country total annihilation.

So far as one can tell, Canada has never completed an independent assessment of whether the current or projected arsenals of these countries pose a clear and present danger to North America. Ottawa has never formally endorsed US threat perceptions, but neither has it sought to generate public debate on the issue – perhaps hoping that it would magically disappear from the security agenda.

Some parliamentarians have taken up the issue, expressing grave reservations over the technical feasibility and political desirability of the proposed defence grid. Cabinet is apparently divided on the implications of missile defence for Canada’s arms control objectives. The possibility that America will one day deploy anti-missile weapons in space does not sit well with some members of the Liberal caucus, even though such defences are not entirely proscribed by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

Nor is it clear whether opposition is partially based on a blanket dislike of all weapons systems, plus a general feeling of antipathy toward the Bush Administration. The President is widely distrusted in Canada. Most international security initiatives emanating from the White House will automatically be suspect.

So what has prompted Paul Martin to agree, however reluctantly, to forge ahead with exploratory talks?

A general desire to improve Canada-US relations – strained by the mutual (and often petty) antagonisms between Jean Chretien and George W. Bush – provides insufficient incentive to say ‘yes’ to missile defence. There are other ways of pursuing rapprochement without fostering disunity in cabinet.

More likely, the about-face stems from four considerations. First, Mr. Martin has come to the realization that the fearsome scenarios put forth by missile defence’ opponents – that deployment would re-ignite a nuclear arms race – were unrealistic. Russia and China have largely muted their reservations about the strategic impact of the defence system. Australia, Denmark, and the United Kingdom have all agreed to lend technical support to the project. The European members of NATO are actively exploring their own missile defence requirements.

Second, Ottawa is aware that Canada’s sovereignty depends on its ability to survey and control national territory, including its airspace and maritime approaches. Membership in the bi-national North American Aerospace Defence command (NORAD) facilitates this in a cost-effective manner, since Washington pays for 90% of NORAD’s upkeep. If Canada were to conclude that NORAD, which is responsible for missile detection and tracking, should not incorporate missile defence into its mandate, would Washington agree? Unlikely, given the time and expense involved in creating a separate organization for missile defence – one in which NORAD’s existing duties would have to be duplicated.

Thus America would simply calculate that the political and financial costs of keeping Canada within the NORAD fold are too high. The bi-national command would dissolve, and Canada would be obliged to spend whatever was necessary to monitor and exercise unambiguous control over its own territory. Establishing a Canada-only version of NORAD would impose significant financial burdens on Mr. Martin’s government.

Thirdly, although Canada and the US have signed over 200 treaties and memoranda covering mutual defence and security, none has the political import of NORAD. The dissolution of the command would not only cut off access to US intelligence-gathering assets, it would sever the most important link between the defence decision-makers in both countries. Under such circumstances, Washington would no longer take seriously into account Canadian views when deciding how to combat threats to aerospace security. The re-nationalization of surveillance and defence tasks would be nearly complete, marking an end to the mutual or collective defence principle upon which Canadian and allied security has rested since the end of the Second World War. 

The fourth reason stems from a scenario put forth by an American academic who travelled with the CISS to NORAD headquarters last fall. In the event that there were two incoming missiles heading for targets on either side of the border, how would a non-NORAD (that is, a US-only) defence command react? Would it spare any effort to knock out the Canada-bound missile, or would priority be assigned to the US-bound weapon? The Canadian and US military officers in attendance shifted uncomfortably in their seats and did not make reply. But the informal consensus among the (mostly Canadian) analysts was that the latter would receive considerably more attention than the former.    

And while an emphatic ‘no’ to missile defence would find favour among Canadian nationalists, Mr. Martin evidently agrees that a neighbour that does not adequately see to its own defence (or that of its neighbours) is less an ally, and more of a liability.

A rather more polite ‘no’ would also send the wrong signal to a neighbour that, for better or worse, has made the link between continental security and the free flow of trade. Odds are that this link will endure even if Mr. Bush loses the 2004 election. 

Mr. Martin’s pragmatism does not end there. Recognizing that the defence grid is plagued by uncertain costs and technological immaturity, he seems to have (wisely) ruled out any major financial contributions to the project. The Pentagon will pick up the tab. With the Canadian taxpayer off the hook, Canada’s most likely contribution will be a few extra air force officers to operate the computers systems at NORAD headquarters in Colorado. This is a burden that Canada can easily live with.

Thus this tentative step toward a Canadian role in the missile shield must not be construed as an endorsement of the utility of system itself. Rather, it should be viewed as an attempt by Mr. Martin to preserve a privileged and mutually beneficial relationship with the superpower at minimum political and financial cost.

Looking ahead, Mr. Martin’s cautious acquiescence may be justified. The three nations which form President Bush’s ‘axis of evil’ have all indicated that their ballistic missiles and/or weapons of mass destruction may be bargained away. North Korea has recently indicated that it would trade its missile and nuclear programs for aid and security guarantees. Iran has opened up its nuclear facilities to international inspection in return for EU trade considerations. Libya’s Muammar Gadaffi has struck an informal deal with the US and Britain which would see him roll back his nascent exotic weapons programs in return for the lifting of the American sanctions that have hobbled his country’s economy. In an uncharacteristic display of statesmanship, he has ratified the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

It is unclear whether these positive developments are due in some measure to the rogues’ fear that Washington might launch an Iraq-style pre-emptive war against them. (They need not worry – America is too engaged in Afghanistan and Iraq to threaten them with regime change.) Regardless, the curtailing of their WMD programs seems to suggest that economic incentives should be given a greater role in encouraging non-proliferation. Before committing more money to the missile defence, America would be well advised to weigh the relative costs of the program versus purchasing the compliance of the rogues’ gallery. 

Still, one cannot be certain that the ‘axis’ disarm fully or verifiably, even if it is offered multi-billion-dollar bribes. North Korea is given to bouts of capriciousness and deception. The accords with Iran and Libya do not require either to dismantle their ballistic missiles. But if the weapons of mass destruction which might have otherwise sat atop them are eliminated, the threat posed by these delivery vehicles drops accordingly. With that, the construction of the defence grid becomes more difficult for Washington hawks to justify.

This may be the Martin Government’s unspoken expectation. Ottawa may be banking on the probability that US plans will be overtaken by events, and that as a result, cabinet discord and public unease over the possible weaponization of space can be avoided entirely. Should Washington introduce space-based defences at a latter date, Canada will have wasted little time, money or political capital in fruitless opposition, hoping that the more politically correct ground-based system would be the extent of America’s ambitions.

In a nutshell, Ottawa’s stance may be summed up thus: participation if necessary, but not necessarily participation. Shrewd political manoeuvring, Mr. Martin. A strategy designed to placate everyone. The question is, will it fly?

David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.

Copyright CISS 2004

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