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In search of homeland security (June, 2005)
by David Rudd
Was it a solution in search of a problem?
The announcement on June 28 that the Canadian military would be re-working its command structure left many analysts scratching their heads. What was wrong with the old command arrangements? Hadn’t the men and women of the armed forces performed ably when called out on domestic duty? Would the newly-minted Canada Command (CANCOM) add yet another layer of bureaucracy to an organization already brimming with it?
Intent on demonstrating the government’s commitment to the safety and security of the home front, Defence Minister Bill Graham unveiled a plan to give military commanders in each major region of Canada the power to employ all military resources within their respective areas of responsibility. This new authority is intended to enable them to respond more quickly to natural or man-made catastrophes including terror attacks, floods and ice storms.
With his usual candour, the Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, declared that the old ways of doing business were not satisfactory in the post-9/11 world. The mustering of military human and material resources to combat, for example, the Winnipeg floods of 1997 would no longer be done in an ad hoc fashion, with no on-going co-ordination between the three armed services, or between the latter and their civilian emergency management counterparts.
Henceforth, the services would no longer be obliged to look to headquarters in Ottawa for approval and planning guidance before embarking on domestic operations. Disaster relief or counter-terrorist efforts could begin immediately after an incident took place.
The significance of the amendment to the military command structure is twofold. If it works as intended, it will increase the speed of the federal response to catastrophic events. This may not be so important if the event can be predicted. Floodwaters take time to rise, giving authorities time to raise the alarm. But when the disaster is unforeseen, as in the case of an earthquake or terrorist bombing, a delay of even a few hours can make the difference between light and heavy casualties.
The proposed changes are also intended to facilitate co-operation between the military commanders and other federal, provincial, and municipal agencies, ensuring that the right mix of resources is brought to bear. The military has transport aircraft, heavy engineering equipment and personnel skilled in nuclear, biological and chemical defence, not to mention a large pool of self-deploying troops capable of doing everything from slinging sandbags to taking down terrorists. Apart from their knowledge of local terrain, civil authorities bring superior fire-fighting equipment, law enforcement capabilities and medical facilities to the table. The intended result is a public security effort that is quick off the mark, and which covers the full spectrum of disaster scenarios.
This is not to suggest that previous responses have been slow or poorly co-ordinated. When Swissair flight 111 crashed off Peggy’s Cove, Nova Scotia in 1998 the armed forces successfully employed air, sea, and land assets for search and rescue, and later for salvage operations. Commanders are already capable of thinking ‘jointly’, in that they understand the capabilities that their sister services bring to the party, and can exploit them accordingly. Thus the Department of National Defence is not re-inventing the wheel; it is merely greasing it.
It is also eager to demonstrate to Canadians that the transformation of Canada’s defence effort is not solely a question of budgets. Establishing a permanent planning cell to make better use of existing resources can theoretically enhance public security more than if one were to simply add to the resource base.
But several questions remain unanswered. Will the proposed changes unnecessarily duplicate the existing chain of command? The Deputy Chief of Defence Staff is in charge of running domestic and overseas operations. Will the former responsibility stripped from him and given to the new CANCOM commander, Vice-Admiral Jean-Yves Forcier? Regardless, the addition of yet another three-star position to the officer corps will do little to reassure critics that the ratio of officers to non-commissioned members in the military will improve anytime soon.
Of greater importance is whether Ottawa will ensure that there is anything tangible to command in the years ahead. It was hard to escape the impression that the June 28 announcement was more politics than substance; an effort to prove to a sceptical public that the government is fully committed to the goals laid out in April’s defence policy statement. Thus while the creation of a new command is indeed a step toward the revitalization of an under-funded and over-stretched military, its symbolic value may outweigh its practical value. All the re-structuring will be for nought if there are inadequate human and material resources to put into the field three or four years from now.
It is easy to deliver on promises that require little or no money. It will be much more difficult to follow through with the billions promised for more troops and equipment. Most of that money will not appear for two or three years, and federal spending priorities can change in the interim. A perpetual parliamentary minority could oblige the Liberals to buy the goodwill of other parties, leaving little money with which to finance the transformation of Canada’s defence effort.
Still, the government is correct to note that how existing forces are employed is as important as how much capacity one has. The new CANCOM will facilitate co-operation with civilian authorities and give Canada an institutional counterpart to US Northern Command (NORTHCOM). Among the latter’s duties is the deployment of military forces to assist civilian authorities engaged in public security operations within the continental United States. Should an earthquake of terrorist attack occur along the Canada-US border, its effects would not be confined to one side of the 49th parallel. CANCOM and NORTHCOM would inevitably communicate and possibly even co-ordinate a bi-national response. Should either Canada or the US be lacking in specific capabilities to ameliorate the situation, the other could lend resources - even put them under the temporary command of the other country.
This might have a knock-on effect through other parts of Canada’s military command structure. If modalities for co-operation are established between CANCOM and NORTHCOM, they could make redundant the Bi-national Planning Group (BPG), a co-ordination cell located in Colorado Springs and staffed by Canadian and US officers tasked with supporting first responders to domestic crises.
The prospect of loss of life and property have a way of moulding diverse actors into a cohesive, unified team. CANCOM will contribute to that end, although more work will have to be done to ensure that military/civilian reporting lines and differing organizational cultures do not impede progress in alleviating the effects of a calamity, as was allegedly the case in Winnipeg in 1997. And, eventually, Ottawa will have to follow through its promises of more people and hardware, lest the entire project be dismissed as the “cosmetic” change that General Hillier insists it isn’t.
The establishment of Canada Command is a welcome step toward ensuring that the military will be responsive to the diverse needs of Canadians. But it is also a low-cost, low-risk matter for the government. Backing it up with tangible resources while avoiding over-bureaucratization will require more than just a pre-occupation with political optics.
David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.
Copyright CISS 2005
