Boosting defence, the Canadian Way
(February, 2005)
by David Rudd

‘Shock and awe’ are not terms one would normally associate with federal commitments to defence at budget time. This is doubly true for minority governments, which are more apt to spend surpluses on vote-getting programs rather than on the military.

Yet many analysts are eating their pocket calculators following the announcement on 23 February that Ottawa would commit almost $13-billion to defence renewal over the next five years. Expectations that the Liberals would cover only the military’s $1.5-billion operating deficit were exceeded on almost every level.

The commitment to the revitalization of the armed forces may have been timed to coincide with the resolution of Canada’s other defence dilemma – whether to sign onto the U.S. ballistic missile defence program. To this Prime Minister Paul Martin issued a very polite “no”, and expressed hope that the budget would defuse persistent and trenchant American criticisms that Canada is not assuming its fair share of the collective defence burden.

On this he may have scored a base hit. The additional appropriations will allow the government to achieve some specific, measurable results including the replacement of the Sea King helicopter and the army’s fleet of transport trucks. To his credit, Mr. Martin will make good on an election pledge to increase the size of the armed forces by 5,000 regulars and 3,000 reservists.

But a base hit is not a home run. Washington may or may not take note of Martin’s soothing words. Many US-based analysts have hinted darkly that Canada’s status as a partner in NORAD could be in jeopardy. Some may observe caustically that none of the equipment projects referred to in the budget allow Canada to put ordnance on a target. This is correct, although it is unclear whether Ottawa’s priorities reflect a vision of what types of military activity are and are not consistent with ‘Canadian values’.

As much as it jump-starts new initiatives, the financial commitment should been seen as a way of playing catch-up with previously made promises. And it is unclear whether the bulk of the money will be spent at all. An election in 2006 or 2007 could see a change in federal spending priorities.

But let us assume that the government can be taken at its word. Does the budget hold out the prospect of transforming the military into a modestly-sized, twenty-first century force able to tackle the wide range of tasks that Canadians have thrown at it?

Yes, to a degree. The money will help recruit the infantrymen, technicians, engineers, medics, and logisticians that are the lynchpin of modern peace support operations. The expansion of the JTF-2 special forces will enhance Canada’s capacity to engage in counter-terrorism. It is also indicative of the heightened awareness of the need to prepare for unconventional rather than conventional warfare. (This, along with the retirement of the army’s tank and mobile artillery fleets, suggests that Canadian involvement in future land combat operations – at least against large, heavily-armed adversaries - is considered to be unlikely.)

The perennial need to transport troops and deliver humanitarian aid to victims of natural disaster (such as last December’s tsunami) will benefit from the surprise announcement that new transport helicopters will be purchased. Their utility will be enhanced if they can be flown from the deck of some form of multi-role transport ship, which the government has also promised.

Up to $3.2-billion of the ‘new’ money will be spent on upgrading medical services, support infrastructure, and to buy spare parts. It is hoped that those spares are not intended for equipment sets which have come to the end of their service lives, and that the infrastructure money is not spent on facilities that are surplus to requirements (more on that below).

Another $3.8-billion is earmarked for projects that will be announced following the up-coming defence review. This seemingly formidable sum should be put into perspective. The proposed joint support ship and air transport programs will, if approved, consume all of these funds.

Strangely, the replacement of decrepit transport aircraft was not mentioned in the budget, even though they are considered essential for domestic security. The government has said that some procurement decisions should be left until after it has tabled its defence policy review. This is hard to fathom, as there are basic elements that any modern military, regardless of its mandate, requires in order to be viable.

If money is the issue here, there is a way forward. Canadians may be labouring under the misperception that they must spend substantially more in order to enhance their military’s effectiveness. But by adjusting how the existing defence budget is administered, the military could increase its capability output by 20 per cent or more.

The Auditor-General has observed that up to half of Canada’s 24 military bases could be shut without degrading the overall effectiveness of the force. Funds saved from the retirement of non-essential infrastructure could be invested in new hardware, or used to pay for overseas missions considered to be essential to the national interest, such as Afghanistan.

Additional savings could be realized by terminating the requirement that all procurement decisions serve non-military, regional development concerns. The practice has had the insidious effect of inflating the cost of a pair of combat boots from $30 to $150, or a navy supply ship from $300-million to $700-million. 

Finally, Treasury Board guidelines could be relaxed to allow the new Chief of Defence Staff, General Rick Hillier, more latitude over how his budget is spent. If funds mandated for the repair and operation of worn-out equipment could be transferred to the capital account so that new and more cost-effective gear could be purchased, the Canadian Forces could retain a broad range of capabilities without having to seek massive additional appropriations at budget time.

The government deserves credit for recognizing that Canada’s diplomatic and international development efforts need to be underwritten by a robust defence. But more needs to be done internally if the prime minister’s dream of Canada standing proudly astride a peaceful, stable international system is to be realized.

Canadians can help. They can demand novel solutions to the perennial question of under-funding, even if it means riding roughshod over parochial interests. If they decline to have a conversation about how best to square the circle, it will be General Hillier’s duty to step in. He will set aside some of the cash he was given to buy a giant meat cleaver, and cut away those parts of the military that Canada can no longer afford.

He will likely have to do so anyway. Countless parliamentary and academic studies have shown that the military cannot handle the tsunami-like wave of obsolescence that has accumulated since the 1980s. Despite the brave actions of the government, the structural disarmament of Canada will likely proceed and culminate around 2010-2012.

Those who optimistically greeted the budget should be take note of the government’s boast that the cash infusion is the biggest in 20 years. That means that it may take at least another two decades until Ottawa breaks with the practice of taking only short-term interest in an institution that requires constant, long-term attention.

David Rudd is the President and Executive Director of the CISS.

Copyright CISS 2005

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