On May 17 something extraordinary happened in the House of Commons. Parliamentarians held the closest thing to a serious debate on a military mission of direct relevance to Canada’s national security in recent memory. 

But the debate was over more than the fate of one mission. 

With casualties mounting in Afghanistan and the crisis in the Darfur region of Sudan inching its way into the political spotlight, Canadians and their leaders are, perhaps unwittingly, revisiting a question that arguably should have been settled with the release of the Liberals’ 2005 International Policy Statement — namely the “proper” role of Canada, and the Canadian Forces, on the international stage. 

To be sure, the debate had an electoral dimension. By seeking cross-party support the Tories evidently wished to neutralize Afghanistan as a possible election issue. It didn’t work. 

Foisting a snap decision on Parliament may have paradoxically turned some MPs who would otherwise support the mission (or at least remain agnostic) against it. The Bloc Québécois expressed contempt for the government’s tactics, arguing that more time was needed to assess the potential risks and rewards. New Democrats argued that fighting insurgents was not an appropriate role for Canada, and called for a return to “traditional” peacekeeping. 

The willingness of both parties (and of some Liberals) to repatriate Canadian Forces before 2009 could play well with voters in a snap election. Externally, however, their reluctance to give unqualified support to the mission will be noticed, and not just in allied capitals. 

Any unwillingness to see the Taliban kept at bay while the Karzai government rebuilds the Afghan army and police will be noted and welcomed by Taliban leadership. 

Thus despite the favourable outcome, Harper’s victory was pyrrhic. The Liberals may have committed Canada to Afghanistan, but the Tories will now “own” the file. 

Another possible reason for public dissatisfaction may be the unfounded perception that Afghanistan’s reconstruction will come at the expense of the UN-approved peacekeeping mission to Darfur — an operation some have argued is more in line with Canada’s values. 

Without explicitly calling for an end to the former so as to undertake the latter, some parliamentarians and non-governmental organizations have been quietly counselling a shift in focus. Their views coincide with polling results showing that support for the Afghan mission is soft. 

Opposition in Quebec to the extension of the Afghan commitment may be unique to that province, where military defeats have a particular resonance.. 

Other sources of public disquiet are less pragmatic and more ideological. 

Stubborn adherence to the myth that Canadian Forces do peacekeeping to the exclusion of all else remains a factor despite a decade of complex and dangerous missions as well as limited participation in two wars since 1991. And those who might otherwise be willing to help rehabilitate a war-torn country simply cannot stomach the idea of cooperating with the Bush administration in Afghanistan or anywhere else. 

Of even greater import is the persistent unwillingness of many Canadians to consider, let alone cite, national interest as the prime motivator of foreign policy behaviour. Values still occupy pride of place within the public mind. 

Action on the Darfur file would certainly uphold Canadian traditions, but it is difficult to argue that the crisis, for all its horrors, has affected (or will affect) the physical security of Canadians as much as the turmoil in Afghanistan. 

Nor is it clear that Canadian participation in a UN-authorized implementation force would be any less problematic from a political or military point of view than would an extension of the Afghan deployment. 

Classical UN peacekeeping missions have historically involved the insertion of a lightly armed force between two or more state parties who agree to be separated, and who exercise full control over their (uniformed) armed forces. 

The Darfur crisis involves the governments of Sudan and Chad, as well as three rebel groups opposing Khartoum and one particularly vicious militia, the janjaweed, fighting in its service. 

Cease-fire agreements are consequently more apt to come apart if only one party feels dissatisfied. And the potential for a reignition of conflict is greater due to the fact that irregular forces do not answer to a higher authority, nor their rank and file. Thus Khartoum’s pledge to disarm the nomadic janjaweed tribesmen promises to be extremely problematic, while the anti-government fighters may quarrel violently among themselves. 

Given the structural weaknesses of the African Union force in Darfur (only 7,000 troops for an area the size of Texas) and the weak mandate handed to it (it may observe and report on crimes against the civil population but not intervene to stop them), a UN force would have to be of sufficient size and configuration to enforce the shaky peace agreement. 

Constructive questions are being asked about Afghanistan, however late in the game. How much will the mission ultimately cost? How do we measure success? What expectations should we have of Afghans? Before we plunge into Darfur, the same intellectual rigour must be applied to the strategic questions germane to that conflict. 

The failure to do so thus far suggests that calling a mission “peacekeeping” is to give it a free pass from public scrutiny. 

Clearly, the Conservatives have inherited a capacity problem from the previous two governments. In essence, Canada is reaping the military incapacity it has sowed. 

So is Canada condemned to sit on the sidelines in Darfur? Not necessarily. A UN mission will almost certainly require aircraft to move troops and supplies across its vast expanse. 

At last look Canada’s tactical helicopter fleet was open for business. Equipped with light armaments and electro-optical gear, a squadron of Griffons could help keep an eye out for janjaweed militias using the cover of darkness to rape and pillage, or anyone else intent on breaking the cease-fire. 

Many uncertainties remain. Those enthusiastically pushing for intervention will have noted that Osama bin Laden has labelled Western pressure on Sudan part of a “crusade against Islam” and has called on jihadists to go and fight there. 

Assuming Khartoum will even let a UN force with a robust mandate into its dominions, the world body has an abysmal record of managing complex peace support operations. It provides legitimacy but precious little capacity. Only a collection of “core” military powers to anchor the mission, or the support of a competent multinational organization (i.e., NATO), will yield any hope of success. 

Logistically, moving the Griffons and their support crews into theatre will be a monumental challenge given Canada’s faltering airlift capability. And the sand and summer heat will take a fierce toll on both man and machine. But if the necessary support can be scraped together, air force helicopter crews should be able to cover themselves, and Canada, in glory. 

Like Afghanistan, Darfur will be no cakewalk. But so long as the choppers are painted UN white, the mission could garner the support of what looks to be an increasingly risk-averse public. 

Despite its electoral undertones, the debate of May 17 was a worthwhile exercise. It allowed MPs to distinguish between a process they openly disdained and an outcome they quietly supported. Whether it will set a precedent, resulting in better oversight of Canada’s future overseas commitments, is unclear. What is clear is that defence or foreign policy-making is not merely a matter of tabling documents in the House and expecting the public to fall in line. Self-image is at least as good an indicator of foreign policy behavior as self-interest. 

David Rudd is president and executive director of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies (CISS).

Copyright CISS 2006

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